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Abstract
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Chali Nondo
This dissertation examines the relationship between environmental regulations and economic
growth in the Appalachian Region. The study employs county attainment status data as a proxy
for environmental regulations and allows the cross-sectional variation of the attainment variable.
Cognizant of the fact that air pollution emanates from a variety of sources, the study assumes
that per capita income, population, employment, and environmental regulations are jointly determined, which is the major distinction from previous studies which have assumed a unidirectional
relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth.
Using endogenous growth theory, a theoretical model is developed that highlights the role of
environmental regulations in economic growth. The major theoretical conclusions reached
suggest that: enforcement of environmental regulations affects economic performance only in the
short-term, while in the long-term, firms become more efficient in production and output increases. In the long-term, environmental regulations lead to improved environmental quality and
this has a direct effect of stimulating growth in population, income, and employment.
In the empirical applications, two econometric techniques are employed. First, the structural
equations are estimated using three stage least squares. Second, the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM)
is applied in order to account for spatial spillovers that emanate from neighboring counties.
Results from the three stage least squares and SDM model are robust. The statistical evidence
supports the theoretical analyses that enforcement of environmental regulations only affects
regional growth in the short-term. Additional evidence from empirical models support the „jobs
follow people‟ and „people follow jobs‟ hypotheses. In addition, empirical estimations show that
changes in population, per capita income, and employment, including socio-economic, political,
and demographic characteristics influence the stringency of environmental regulations.
With regard to the SDM estimations, important findings are that a county‟s regional growth and
environmental regulation stringency not only depend on own county characteristics, but are
indirectly influenced by neighboring counties‟ characteristics. Furthermore, results from the
SDM model indicate that there is some form of strategic interaction in environmental policymaking among some counties in the Appalachian Region in the form of a race to the top.
The research findings reinforce the need to design and implement environmental regulations that
stimulate economic growth and enhance environmental quality. Another policy implication is
that besides imposing stringent environmental regulations on major polluting industries, attention
needs to be paid to other socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to emission of
pollutants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The debate over the impact of environmental regulations on economic growth has a long
history (e.g., Denison, 1979; Portney, 1981; McConnell and Schwab, 1990). Generally, the belief
is that environmental regulations are detrimental to economic growth; therefore, their
implementation has been controversial among economists and environmental policymakers. The
debates over the past three decades have been over how to design regulations that promote
environmental quality without slowing economic growth. The general consensus is that many
environmental problems such as global warming, water quality degradation, air quality problems,
land degradation, habitat loss, resource exhaustion, municipal solid waste problems, and biodiversity loss are attributable to human activities. These environmental problems have been cited
in many studies as having negative effects on the social and economic welfare of communities
(e.g., Anselin et al., 2004; Waddell, 1974). For example, air pollution emanating from diverse
sources generally imposes costs on society such as increased health, cleaning, and production
expenses.
Concern over air quality problems culminated in the passage of the Clean Air Act [CAA]
in 1970, which was amended in 1977 and 1990. The CAA gave legislative powers to the
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to develop a national clean air program that would
establish uniform air quality standards. The 1970 Clean Air Act set National Ambient Air
Quality Standards [NAAQS] for six major air pollutants: tropospheric ozone (O3), total suspended particulates (TSP), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2),

and lead (Pb). The NAAQS are a set of standards that represent the maximum permissible
ambient concentrations of the six pollutants. To promote public health and welfare, the CAA has
assigned the primary responsibility for air pollution regulation to state and local governments
(Condliffe and Morgan, 2009). Thus, state and local governments administer the CAA by
developing state implementation plans (SIP) which outline how states are going to comply with
federal pollution standards. This means that U.S. states retain considerable flexibility in the
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations; this is reflected in the variation
of regulatory intensity among states (Levison, 2000). Areas within a state that fail to meet the
NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants established by the EPA are designated as non-attainment
areas. In 2004, the EPA designated 474 counties (out of 3,140 U.S. counties or equivalent
jurisdictions) from 32 states and the District of Columbia as non-attainment for the ozone
standard requirements and another 225 counties from 20 states were listed as non-attainment
under the TSP standard or PM
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(Esworthy, 2007). Counties that violate federal air quality

standards expose their populations to dangerous toxics.
Variations in environmental regulation implementation among and within states have
significant impacts on the mobility of capital and other resources across local jurisdictions, and
this may affect economic growth (Hosoe and Naito, 2006). For example, a county‟s nonattainment status entails increased regulatory restrictions on pollution sources, and this,
generally, results in increased pollution control compliance costs. In addition, the federal government can withhold federal funding for highway construction in non-attainment counties and
impose a ban on the construction of new plants that would significantly add to emissions. Thus,
the designation of a county as non-attainment may result in loss of jobs and is likely to make a
difference in whether or not it will be able to retain and attract businesses. In summary, the non-
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attainment designation puts an area at a competitive disadvantage relative to attainment areas by
creating additional regulatory burdens for businesses (Harrison, 2008).
Utility maximizing individuals and profit maximizing firms will take into account
variations in environmental policy and economic incentives when choosing their location. This
phenomenon is akin to Tiebout‟s sorting hypothesis: different preferences for environmental
amenities will result in self-selection (Tiebout, 1956). This means that location choice decisions
for households and firms involve a trade-off between economic factors as well as the quality of
the environment. It is well known that the quality of the environment in U.S. states has been
determined by local and state authorities. In spite of significant improvements in environmental
quality in the U.S., environmental policymaking is an area that has drawn controversy in relation
to its impact on economic growth. As discussed above, the general view is that environmental
regulations thwart economic growth. For the purpose of this study, environmental regulation
stringency is measured by county level attainment status of the federal air quality standard for
O3, SO2, TSP, Pb, and CO.
Contrary to the view that environmental regulations thwart economic growth, Porter
(1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that environmental regulations stimulate
technological innovation and lead to industrial growth. This view is known as the Porter
hypothesis. The Porter hypothesis posits that well designed environmental regulations result in a
number of multiplier effects such as productivity improvement and improved firm profitability.
Berman and Bui (2001) present evidence that supports the Porter hypothesis by showing that
manufacturing productivity for the Los Angeles Air Basin refineries increased during the period
1987-1992. The Porter hypothesis could work because firms complying with state and local
environmental regulations will invest in new capital equipment that improve productivity and at
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the same time help reduce emissions of pollutants. An improvement in air quality has an amenity
value and that may also affect the pattern of economic growth (Van, 2002; Grossman and
Krueger, 1995).
In response to the Porter hypothesis, a number of studies have attempted to shed more
light on the relationship between environmental regulations and economic performance. Within
this context, conflicting empirical results emerge. Goetz et al. (1996), for instance, argue that
stringent environmental regulations result in increased environmental quality, which in turn helps
to attract businesses, skilled workers, and wealthy citizens to regions with better environmental
quality. This means that such regions experience employment growth, income growth, and
demographic changes due to improved environmental quality (Gottlieb, 1995; Mobley and
Izraeli, 1995; Izraeli, 1985).
Some empirical studies have found evidence that contradicts the Porter hypothesis and
show that environmental regulations negatively affect productivity and location decisions of new
plants (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993; Jaffe, 1995; List and Co, 1999; Tannenwald, 1997). This
means that environmental regulations can act as a barrier to the entry of polluting firms in a
particular market. This may alter the structure of the market in terms of the number of firms in
the industry entering a particular county and thereby reduce competition (Kohn, 1985). Standard
neoclassical economic theory has shown that a profit maximizing firm takes into account
environmental regulations prevailing in an area. Hence, investment decisions are influenced by
the stringency of environmental regulations (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993). This view has led to
the theory of a “race to the bottom,” a situation where environmental regulations in a particular
locale move below optimal levels in order to be more attractive to firms than competing
jurisdictions (Engel, 1997). Theoretically, lax environmental regulations allow firms to have
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lower operating costs because they spend less on pollution control. Thus, reduced operating costs
may result in higher profits and this may help retain businesses as well as attract businesses to a
given jurisdiction.
Many studies critical of Porter‟s hypothesis have argued that environmental compliance
results in increased cost of production for polluting firms and higher prices for consumers.
Undoubtedly, this results in the diversion of inputs which contribute to industrial productivity,
consequently affecting relocation and investment decisions of firms. Productivity, broadly
defined as output per unit of input, is believed to be an important determinant of competitiveness
as well as an essential factor in economic growth and improved standard of living (APOGEE,
1991). Yandle (1985, p. 39) points out that the “effects of environmental regulations go far
beyond the physical plant closings and worker layoffs" and that the regional concentration of
polluting industries may affect regional development. These views recognize the fact that
manufacturing is not isolated from the rest of the national economy and that, therefore, the
effects of environmental regulations on manufacturing may inadvertently affect other sectors of
the economy which supply goods and services to the manufacturing sector, consequently
affecting regional development. The effects may also result in welfare distortions in local
communities which are heavily dependent on tax receipts and other royalties from polluting
firms to finance public infrastructure programs (Tannenwald, 1997).
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the impact of environmental regulation
stringency on economic growth remains an open question. The inconsistencies in results in the
literature can be attributed to a number of factors, including estimation methods, data issues,
focus of study, and stated objectives. While some of the studies provide anecdotal evidence,
many of the empirical studies have failed to produce irrefutable evidence on the interactions of
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environmental regulations and regional growth. The central theme of previous studies has been
to estimate the impact of environmental regulations on productivity changes and firm location
choices. Previous studies have also overlooked the fact that indirect employment effects arise in
firms supplying the producers of pro-environmental goods with capital or services to polluting
firms. To this end, the pertinent question to be asked is: what is the role of local environmental
regulation in regional development?
In order to address this question, this research extends the work of Li (2006) who
examines the impact of environmental regulations on employment and population change. Li
utilizes a regional growth model that takes into account the interdependencies between employment and population changes, and how these growth factors are affected by environmental
regulation stringency. The major shortcoming of Li‟s study is that it does not take into account
the feedback relationship between environmental regulation stringency and changes in
population and employment, respectively. In this study, it is argued that environmental regulation stringency in a particular locale is likely to be jointly determined with other regional
factors such as per capita income, population, and employment. Ostensibly, complying with
environmental regulations results in the diversion of income from factors such as health,
education, and housing that affect human welfare and economic growth. The literature on the
environmental Kuznets curve shows that an increase in per capita income is associated with a
decrease in pollution, because environmental quality is a normal good; hence demand for
environmental quality increases through the income effect (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). This
means that utility is likely to increase (decrease) as income goes up (down). By the same token,
changes in some of the socio-economic and demographic factors, including firms‟ rent seeking
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activities, may influence the level of environmental regulations (Cole et al. 2006; Nelson et al.
1986).
The existing literature has examined only a portion of the larger problem. Therefore, any
modeling attempting to understand the impacts of environmental regulations on regional growth
should take into account simultaneous interactions among environmental regulations, income,
population, and employment changes. Thus, the purpose of this study is to take a first step in
filling the aforementioned gap in previous studies by using a four simultaneous equation model.
The model captures the feedback relationships among population change, employment change,
per capita income change, and environmental regulation [county attainment status].
This study differs from previous studies in two fundamental ways. First, this study
focuses on the role of environmental regulations in economic growth by capturing the
interdependent relationship among changes in employment, population, per capita income, and
environmental regulations. Thus, the analysis is extended beyond the firms and industries
directly affected by environmental regulations. Using econometric techniques, this approach
uniquely traces the structural relationships of the endogenous factors by utilizing a four-equation
simultaneous regional growth model, a variant of the Deller et al. (2001) growth model.
Second, the study considers the inter-jurisdictional differences in economic growth and
environmental regulation stringency. This is aimed at capturing the spillover-effects resulting
from the spatial heterogeneity in economic incentives and environmental policy making across
jurisdictions by use of a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Thus, the second contribution of this
study is the use of the spatial regression methodology that captures the direct effects, indirect
effects (spillovers), and total effects arising from the changes in the dependent variables and
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explanatory factors. The methodology developed by LeSage and Pace (2009) will form the basis
for drawing conclusions on the statistical significance of the direct, indirect, and total effects.
1.2 Profile of Study Area
The study area is confined to the 410 counties of the Appalachian Region, which includes
all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The region
is divided into three distinct geographic subregions: northern, central, and southern Appalachia,
as shown in figure 1.1. Northern Appalachia includes counties of Maryland, Ohio, New York,
Pennsylvania, and 46 counties in West Virginia. Central Appalachia includes counties in eastern
parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, southwestern parts of Virginia, and 9 southern counties of West
Virginia. Southern Appalachia consists of counties in Alabama, northern parts of Georgia,
Mississippi, North and South Carolina, eastern parts of Tennessee, and western parts of Virginia.
Of the three subregions, the northern region is the most urban, while the central region is the
most rural.
Data from the 2000 United States census of population indicate that the Appalachian
region had a population of some 23 million, equivalent to 8 percent of the U.S. population. The
net change in population between 1990 and 2000 for the Appalachian region was estimated to be
9.5 percent, compared to the U.S rate of 13.1 percent. State populations range from roughly 1.8
million in West Virginia to more than 5 million in the Appalachian counties of Pennsylvania.
Population growth has been uneven due to marked differences in economic opportunities, terrain,
services, infrastructure, and so forth.
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Figure 1.1: Appalachian Counties and Subregions

Source: Appalachian Regional Commission, 2002
Poverty continues to be a challenge to the region‟s population (Glasmeier and Fuellhart,
1999). In 2000, 13.6 percent of the region‟s population lived in poverty, as compared to 12.4
percent of the U.S. population. Educational attainment in Appalachia is well below the national
average. In 2000, for example, the percent of high school and college graduates, respectively,
was 76.8 and 17.7 percent versus the U.S. figures of 80.4 and 24.4 percent. Regional levels of
per capita income are also below those of the U.S. as a whole and labor force participation is
lower than the U.S. average (Acs and Kallas, 2007). The number of jobs per 100 people in the
Appalachian region is approximately 53.09 compared to the national rate of 59.59 jobs,
underscoring the relative dearth of economic opportunities in the region. Table 1 summarizes
important socioeconomic indicators in the Appalachian region.
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Table 1.1: 2000 Economic and Demographic Indicators for Appalachian Region and the U.S.

Indicator

Appalachian Region

United States

Population (million)

22,894,017

281,421,906

Per Capita Income ($)

27, 124

33,050

Poverty Rate (%)

13.6

12.4

Population 25 and Older with 4 years of College (%)

17.7

24.4

Number of Jobs per 100 People

53.09

59.59

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), a state and federal partnership program,
uses the level of local economic development as a basis for classifying counties into four
categories: distressed, transitional, competitive, and attainment counties. Despite the fact that
some counties are in better economic shape than they were in the 1990‟s, the region continues to
grapple with economic challenges as seen by the increase in the number of distressed counties
between 2002 and 2005 (see figures 1.2 and 1.3).
As of 2004, a majority of the counties in Central Appalachia and a few counties located
in Southern Appalachia were classified as distressed counties. Distressed counties are those with
unemployment and poverty rates that are at least 1.5 times the national rate and a per capita
income no greater than two-third of the national average. Transitional counties are those whose
economies are transitioning between strong and weak economies. Counties with unemployment
and poverty rates better than the national average are classified as competitive counties, while
counties which are at par with national levels in terms of poverty, unemployment and income are
classified as attainment.
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Figure 1.2: 2002 Appalachian Counties’ Economic Status

Figure 1.3: 2005 Appalachian Counties' Economic Status

Source: Appalachia Regional Commission
The Appalachian region‟s economy has been transformed over the last three decades and
has moved from being an economy dependent on manufacturing, agriculture, and coal mining, to
11

one that is more diversified and more dependent on service sector employment (Wood, 2005).
These structural changes have led to loss of jobs in the core industries of Appalachia, particularly
the coal industry. Today, manufacturing, services, and government occupations account for the
majority of jobs in the Appalachian region.
The Appalachian region is chosen for two primary reasons. First, the 118 coal-mining
counties of the Appalachian region account for more than one-third of the coal produced in the
U.S., coal mining remains a major industrial activity for the region. Some air pollution because
of coal related activities is therefore unavoidable (see figures 5.2 and 5.3). Given that coal is a
cheap energy source, a number of coal-fired power plants and other industries have strategically
located in the Appalachian region, resulting in emissions of:
Carbon dioxide, the major greenhouse gas that is linked to global warming.
Sulfur dioxide, a chemical that produces acid rain when it reacts with moisture.
Carbon monoxide, a colorless and odorless gas that has serious health impacts to both
animals and humans
Nitrogen oxides, a chemical which leads to ozone and acid rain and causes serious
health and environmental problems such as damage to lungs, reduced crop yield,
among others.
Mercury, a chemical which eventually settles in water and has the potential to harm
fish and other aquatic life, as well as humans.
Consequently, people who live in Appalachia are subject to environmental degradation and
exposure to pollutants. Emissions of pollutants from industrial facilities, combined with emissions from vehicles and agricultural processes have contributed to counties‟ non-attainment
status for NAAQS. Enforcement of the federal air quality regulations is likely to have significant
12

impacts on manufacturing, coal mining, and other related industries, and on communities that
depend on income from regulated industries.
Secondly, considering that Appalachia is mostly rural and is confronted by a host of
economic problems, such as high unemployment and poverty rates and low per capita income,
the question that needs to be addressed by policymakers is whether the issue of environmental
injustice applies to the region. The literature on environmental justice shows that the majority of
polluting industrial facilities is in low income areas—implying that people of lower socio-economic status will disproportionately suffer from environmental exposures (Morrone, 2008;
Sicotte, 2009). Research also documents that residents of Appalachian coal-mining communities
have increased incidences of lung cancer and mortality rates, and high hospitalization rates for
cardiovascular and respiratory illnesses compared to other, non-coal mining, regions of the
country (Hendryx, 2008).
1.3 Problem Statement
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. population is expected to double in the
next century and it is expected that this growth will cause significant environmental changes,
assuming continuation of current trends in housing consumption, commuting, and infrastructure
development (EPA, 2001). A growing body of literature also suggests that the increase in
vehicle-miles traveled by cars and trucks is the leading source of air pollution (Cassady et al.,
2004).
In order to protect the environment and safeguard public health, federal and state
interventions are necessary. All environmental policy intervention causes consumers and
producers to incur the cost externalities. Therefore, environmental regulation stringency
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influences firms‟ and households‟ location decisions as well as their production and consumption
decisions.
There is a large body of literature on environmental regulations and economic performance, but results are ambiguous. Cole et al. (2006) assert that this is because environmental
regulations have been treated as exogenous. This suggests that an accurate representation in an
econometric model must account for simultaneity between environmental regulation and
economic growth. Given that environmental regulation has been treated as exogenous, most
previous empirical studies assume unidirectional causality, which means that OLS estimation
produces biased and inconsistent results.
This study extends the knowledge by accounting for the feedback relationships, using a
four equation simultaneous regional growth model that captures the interdependences among
population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulations. There is currently no
study that has considered these interdependences. Figure 1.4 illustrates the simultaneous interactions between environmental regulation and economic growth.
Figure 1.4: Simultaneous Interactions between Environmental Regulations and Economic
Growth

County Total
Employment

Environmental
Regulations

County per
Capita
Income

County
Population
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1.4 Research Justification
Understanding the underlying process of developing and implementing environmental
regulation that promotes environmental quality and also enhances economic growth is a
challenging task for policymakers. In addition, implementation of policies such as air quality
regulation requires an understanding of the dynamics between air pollution and economic growth
because social and economic forces cause environmental change and thus influence a county‟s
attainment status, while attainment status impacts a county‟s economic performance.
The task of developing optimal policies that promote environmental quality and
economic growth has become more complicated due to increased interstate economic competition. Increased interstate economic competition is hypothesized to cause a race to the bottom if
states feel that they cannot adopt stricter environmental regulation than competitors1. To avert a
race to the bottom, policymakers need to understand the direct and indirect effects of
environmental regulation stringency on economic and demographic factors and vice versa. By
extending the modeling beyond firms and industries directly affected by environmental
regulations, this study is instructive regarding the impact of environmental regulations on economic performance. The results from this research are useful to local and state policymakers
because they identify the potential to simultaneously promote economic growth and
environmental quality.

1

The theory maintains that when states are confronted with interstate competition, states have an incentive to reduce
environmental standards in order to attract mobile capital and thus gain competitive advantage over other
jurisdictions. Engel (1997) provides a good exposition on the issue of race to the bottom.
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1.5 Research Objectives
The general objective of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between
environmental regulations and changes in regional growth in the Appalachian region. The specific objectives are:
1.0 To develop a model that takes into account the feedback relationships between income,
employment, population and environmental regulations.
2.0 To empirically determine the impact of county differences in environmental regulations on
population, income, and employment and vice versa.
3.0 To empirically identify the key regional growth factors that influence environmental
regulation stringency.
4.0 To draw relevant policy recommendations from the empirical findings.
1.6 Hypotheses
In order to analyze the relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth,
this study will test the following five hypotheses:
1. The share of manufacturing employment is inversely related to environmental regulation
stringency but positively related to economic growth.
2. Manufacturing industry establishments have a positive effect on employment growth, per
capita income, and environmental regulation stringency.
3. Environmental regulations positively affect income, population growth, and employment.
This, implicitly tests the Porter hypothesis which suggests that environmental regulations, if
properly designed, will spur economic growth in the long-term.
4. Higher levels of per capita income raise the public‟s demand for environmental regulation,
which translates into improved environmental quality.
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5. Demographic variables and county characteristics such as population, unemployment rate,
age, education, and race play a key role in environmental outcomes.
1.7 Organization of the Study
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature on
environmental regulation and economic growth. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundation
for developing the empirical model. Chapter 4 explains the method of estimation and introduces
the data types and sources. Chapter 5 presents the empirical research findings and interpretation.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the findings, policy implications, limitations, and
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the environmental regulationeconomic growth relationship. The vast majority of past studies have exclusively focused on
affected industries in the manufacturing sector. The justification for this is that many of the
environmental policies are directed at manufacturing industries and, therefore, aggregate changes
in employment, firm expansion or contraction directly affect the manufacturing industry (Bartik,
1985). Consequently, several researchers including Condliffe and Morgan (2009), Duffy-Deno
(1992), Gray and Shadbegian (2002), and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) estimate the impact
of environmental regulation on economic growth using a single equation. Many of these researchers agree that the variables used as proxies for environmental regulations introduce endogeneity bias in the estimation because environmental regulations can be endogenously determined
by a number of factors such as income, population, and employment change, and many other
socio-economic characteristics. Thus, one unexplored area in the empirical literature is the use of
structural equations in estimating the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review on the
measures of environmental regulations used in previous studies. Section 2.3 provides a review of
literature on the demand and supply sides of environmental regulations and section 2.4 is a
review of literature on the environmental regulation-economic growth relationship. Section 2.5
provides an overview on the determinants of regional growth.
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2.1 Measures of Environmental Regulation Stringency
A survey of the literature reveals lack of agreement on the causal relationships between
environmental regulation and regional growth (Gray and Shadbegian, 1993). There is also no
agreement on the appropriate measure for environmental regulation at the county-and state-level,
respectively. Consequently, various measures of environmental regulation have been used in past
studies, as the following section shows.

2.1.1 National Ambient Air Quality Standards
The most widely used measure of environmental regulation stringency at the county-level
is the attainment status of the CAA standard for NAAQS (Becker and Henderson, 2000;
Fredriksson and Millet, 2001; Greenstone, 2002; List et al., 2003). Counties whose air quality
meets federal standards have attainment status and counties that do not meet the standards are in
non-attainment. The 1977 CAA amendments further impose stringent pollution control for new
and expanding sources in non-attainment areas. In order to prevent the worsening of air quality
in attainment areas, the 1977 amendments also set tougher standards for new sources in
attainment areas by establishing the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). The 1990 CAA
amendments further strengthened regulations towards electric utilities by limiting the amount of
sulfur dioxide and mercury emissions. In addition, the amendments introduced the sulfur dioxide
emissions program and tightened motor vehicle emissions standards.
Many studies show that air quality regulation imposed when a county fails to achieve
federal ambient air quality standards negatively affect firm location and investment decisions,
and productivity levels. New plants locating in non-attainment areas face more stringent (costly)
environmental regulation than existing firms located in attainment counties. Therefore, nonattainment is thought to discourage new business investment. Typically, new firms locating in
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non-attainment counties are subject to a standard of Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER),
which imposes adoption of cleanest technologies, regardless of cost, while new firms locating in
attainment counties are only required to install Best Available Technology (BAT). Therefore,
Maloney and McCormick (1982) assert that the regulatory bias against new sources of
environmental pollution protects existing firms from competition and allows them to earn positive economic profits. Differentiated regulation provides an incentive to retard the turnover of the
capital stock if only new investments are subject to stricter regulation. This increases the cost of
environmental protection and retards attainment of the desired minimum environmental quality
(Duffy-Deno, 1992; Fullerton and Kim, 2006).
2.1.2 Superfund Sites and Number of Inspections
The second measure of environmental regulation stringency is the number of superfund
sites in a county and its related costs. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the EPA is given power to place sites that
pose an imminent and substantial danger to public welfare and the environment on the National
Priorities List (NPL).2 The Superfund Act has also given the EPA the power to sue firms for the
release of hazardous waste and compel them to clean-up, remediate, and pay monetary
compensation for personal damage. Remediation costs typically include capital costs, operating,
maintenance and monitoring costs. The growing importance of environmental quality, combined
with the increase in the number of claims associated with contaminated site clean-ups has also
provided an impetus for institutions, such as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), banks,
insurance companies, and accounting firms to require firms to disclose their environmental

2

The EPA assesses hazardous wastes sites and uses a set of criteria to place the sites that are a potential threat to
human health and the environment on the National Priorities List.
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liabilities and costs (Harper and Adams, 1997).3 Within this context, previous studies have
estimated economic benefits and impacts of the Superfund program and have determined that
compliance with the Superfund legislation can result in improvements of public welfare (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2005) as well as affect corporate earnings, ability to obtain a loan, and
consequently affect investment activities (Lawrence and Khurana, 1997; Walden and Schwartz,
1997).
A less commonly used measure for environmental regulation stringency is the number of
regulatory inspections of a firm. This measure of environmental regulation has been applied in
county-level and state-level studies (Anton et al., 2004). If a firm that has been subjected to a
higher number of inspections in the past faces a greater chance of receiving penalties, then it is
more likely to adopt measures that reduce compliance costs. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003)
point out that increased monitoring activities may result in the loss of reputation of the polluting
firm as well as loss of contracts.

2.1.3 Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures
Many state-level empirical studies have used pollution abatement costs and expenditures
(PACE) as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. The PACE survey covers data on
U.S. manufacturing, mining, and electric facilities‟ costs of complying with environmental
regulations, including operating and capital expenditures for air, water, and solid waste pollution
abatement efforts. It is conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the EPA. Studies that
have used PACE as a measure of environmental regulation stringency have focused on a wide
array of issues, and results from these studies generally indicate that pollution abatement costs
3

The Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act enacted in 1986 mandated all manufacturing facilities in the U.S.
to disclose to the public their release of all toxic chemicals in air, water, and land. Arguably, the environmental
disclosure Act has provided an impetus for some companies to improve environmental performance in order to
improve their corporate image as well as avoid liabilities, and consumer boycotts.
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negatively affect industry productivity. Duffy-Deno (1992) examines the impact of PACE on
manufacturing employment and earnings in the United States and shows that PACE has a
negative effect on manufacturing employment and earnings. Gray and Shadbegian (1993) also
use PACE as a measure of environmental regulation and their results show that PACE is
negatively related to total factor productivity and to the growth rate. These research findings
corroborate results from other studies that find that PACE negatively affects economic
production (Barber and McConnell, 1986; Denison, 1979).

2.1.4 Environmental Indexes
In addition to direct costs of complying with environmental regulation, a variety of
indexes representing state environmental regulation stringency has been used to measure
environmental regulation stringency. Two of the most widely used environmental regulation
indexes are the FREE index and Green index. The Fund for Renewable Energy Environment
(1987) developed the FREE index that indicates U.S. states‟ strength of environmental regulation
programs on air quality regulation, hazardous waste, and groundwater pollution. The FREE
index measures the number of monitoring stations in a state and the number of enforcement
actions initiated by a state (Potoski, 2002). Hall and Kerr (1989) developed the Green index
which is based on 256 measures of state environmental standards and public policy. The Green
index includes an air quality index, water quality index, and toxic index. Other indexes less
commonly used include the Southern Studies index and the League of Conservation Voters index
(LCV). Sanyal (2007) used the LCV to capture political attitude towards environmental issues.
The LCV keeps track of state senators‟ and congressmen‟s votes on environmental issues
ranging from global warming, biodiversity loss to wetland conservations. It assigns a value to
each pro-environment vote.
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For the purpose of this study, county attainment status of the federal air quality standards
will be used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. Attainment status of a county is
an appealing proxy for environmental regulation stringency because air quality problems result
from several stationary pollution sources including power plants, factories, farming, heating of
buildings, as well as cars, buses, and other mobile sources. Together, these sources represent
production and consumption activities that contribute to environmental degradation. It can also
be argued that county attainment status is an appropriate measure for environmental regulation
stringency because its enforcement is felt by the county‟s households and firms; therefore, the
analysis of such impacts must be made at county-level (Greenstone, 2002; Jeppesen et al. 2002;
List et al. 2003).
2.2 Supply of and Demand for Environmental Regulations
Welfare economics shows that without any form of regulation society will not allocate
resources optimally because of market failure. Market failure manifests itself in forms such as
sub-optimal air pollution, water quality degradation, and land degradation that impose unreimbursed costs on people and firms not responsible for the pollution. Typically, when production of
a good generates significant negative externalities, profit maximizing firms in a competitive
market supply too much of that good. Consumers benefit from lower prices and consume more
of the good than is socially optimal. This occurs because the externalities are not accounted for
in the cost of production and consumption. Therefore, the principal rationale for the supply of
environmental regulation is market failure (Swanson, 2008). Environmental regulation is
therefore supplied proactively, placing constraints on the use of resources and providing the basis
for sustainable economic development (Swanson, 2008).
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According to the political economy literature, the supply side of environmental regulation
consists of appointed bureaucrats and elected politicians (Hacket, 2001; Schluga, 2004). Political
forces are assumed to be crucial in influencing economic behavior of individuals, firms, and
markets. The bureaucrats‟ role is to design environmental regulation that is fair, efficient, and
compatible with the existing institutional framework. Institutional structure relates to issues such
as party control, seniority, the role of committees and committee chairs, voting rules, and other
aspects of procedure that have impacts on legislative and administrative outcomes (Hacket,
2001).
Environmental regulation imposes constraints on the use of a resource by polluters. This
creates a shadow price for the resource‟s use and stimulates technological innovation. Politicians,
on the other hand, enact (supply) regulations that are appealing to their constituents, while also
accommodating interest groups (Schluga, 2004). The assumption is that politicians, like other
economic agents, are motivated by incentives such as ideology, economic prosperity, reelection,
and power when selecting policies that best serve the public (Hacket, 2001). Politicians try to
supply environmental regulations that satisfy the interest groups in order to maximize their
chance of electoral success (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2001).
Because environmental regulation stimulates technological innovation, regulatory outcomes also depend on the expected costs of pollution control, which are a function of current and
future costs (Schluga, 2004). Thus, another important determinant of the supply of environmental regulation is induced innovation, which forms the basis for improved productivity and
competitiveness.
The demand for environmental regulations originates from individuals and firms (Hacket,
2001). As perceived health risks or damage to the environment increase, demand for environ-
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mental regulation increases because individuals react to prevent a significant reduction in their
welfare.
Firms that are negatively affected by environmental regulation may organize themselves
in trade associations and lobby for lower environmental standards (Hackett, 1995). Strict
environmental regulation often also results in the loss of jobs. Consequently, workers in
polluting industries may also oppose tougher standards. However, other firms may demand
restrictive environmental regulation because it creates a new market for their products or services
while erecting entry barriers for potential new entrants (Schluga, 2004).
Kahn (2008) examines the determinants of environmental regulations and finds that
demographic factors such as educational attainment, income, age, population, and race
significantly influence the demand for environmental regulations in the United States. Higher
levels of education mean that people are better informed about environmental risks and this may
increase demand for environmental regulation.
Using the Green index as a measure of environmental regulation stringency, Hay et al.
(1996) examine factors that influence environmental policymaking. They use six factors to
capture the demand side of environmental regulation: environmental conditions, economic
resources, state pressure, political ideology, institutional characteristics and federal activity. State
pressure is represented by state membership in environmental groups and percentage of
employees in the manufacturing sector. Hay et al. find that membership in environmental groups,
percentage of employees in manufacturing, and political ideology are positively associated with
environmental regulation stringency.
Fredriksson and Millimet (2001) analyze the determinants of environmental policymaking in the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Their primary research objective is to examine if there
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is a “California effect” when U.S. states adopt environmental policies.4 Fredriksson and Millimet
posit that environmental policymaking in one state is affected by the environmental standards in
neighboring states, as well as other factors such as per capita income, population, population
density, and urbanization. In their estimation, they recognize that environmental regulation
stringency can be endogenously determined with other factors. To circumvent the endogeneity
problem, they use instrumental variable estimation. Fredriksson and Millimet find that abatement
expenditures in one state are influenced by abatement expenditure in the neighboring state and
that California has a marginal leadership role in other states‟ automobile emission standards.
This is consistent with previous research on strategic environmental policymaking that indicates
that the level of environmental regulation stringency in one jurisdiction will impact the level in
neighboring jurisdictions.5
2.3 Environmental Regulation and Economic Performance
Since its inception, the EPA has been concerned about the effects of environmental
regulation on promoting opportunities for economic and industrial growth (APOGEE, 1991). To
that end, the EPA has conducted economic-impact analyses to determine the impact of
environmental regulation enforcement on society and regulated industries. The EPA concluded
that environmental regulation has impacts at the community-level, facility or industry-level,
company-level, and market-level (EPA, 1999). The EPA recognizes that regulatory compliance
costs are incorporated into the production decisions of polluting firms, and this raises the cost of
4

Vogel (1995) provide anecdotal evidence that indicate that California‟s high automobile emission standards
influence emission standards adopted by other states in the U.S. He refers to this phenomenon as the „California
effect.‟ In general, California effect refers to a situation in which environmental regulations adopted by one
jurisdiction are adopted by other jurisdictions.
5

Fredriksson and Millimet (2001) develop a model of yardstick competition that shows that California‟s
environmental standards have an impact on other U.S. states‟ environmental decisions. Additional insights on
strategic environmental policymaking are found in Wilson (1996) who provides a succinct survey of the literature.
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production. These effects cause an upward shift in the supply function of the regulated firms; an
upward shift in the supply function represents an additional cost per unit of output. The
interactions between changes in supply and demand will result in a new equilibrium price and
quantity. Therefore, in the aggregate environmental regulation stringency impacts employment,
profit, facility closures, and tax revenue.
Over the last 30 years economists have developed and applied various tools to understand
the determinants of state economic growth and how regulatory policies (both economic and
environmental policies) influence economic outcomes. Researchers analyzing the impact of
environmental regulation stringency have used techniques such as survey methods, general
equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models, and the social accounting matrix approach.
Denison (1979) is one of the pioneers to study the relationship between environmental
regulations and economic performance. Denison uses a growth accounting model to analyze the
impact of environmental policies on U.S. economic growth. The results show that environmental
compliance costs are responsible for a productivity loss of 13-20% over the period 1976-1978. In
a related study, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) use a general equilibrium macro-model to
quantify the impacts of environmental regulation stringency. Their model includes a long-term
growth component with and without environmental regulations. They find that in an economy
without environmental regulations the capital stock would be 3.792% higher and GNP would be
2.5% higher. Like Denison, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen find that mandated investments in pollution
control equipment negatively affect GDP growth.
While many studies have shown that environmental regulation enforcements affect the
marginal production cost, other studies have attempted to explain the economy-wide impacts of
environmental regulations. Lieu (1991) utilizes a REMI model to understand economic and
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demographic impacts of complying with the South Coast Air Quality Management Rule
(SCAQMD) applied to electric utilities in Southern California. The REMI model consists of 53
industries, 94 occupations, and 25 final demand sectors. He builds the model based on the
assumption that producers and consumers in all regions of the country have similar behavioral
characteristics. Simulation results for the 53 sector REMI model indicate that complying with
SCAQMD increases the cost of doing business for affected facilities. Lieu asserts that affected
firms may hike electricity rates in order to recover the increased control expenditures. He also
finds that, on average, job growth is slowed and this translates into slower population growth.
Theoretically, the rise in the electricity price causes the substitution of labor and capital for fuel
in production. In effect, this increases demand for labor and capital and generates upward
pressure on the wage rate and the cost of capital.
Harrison and Dreyfus (1995) quantify the socioeconomic impacts of proposed
environmental regulations on electric utilities in Minnesota. Their study links the treatment of
environmental externalities from utilities to statewide socioeconomic effects. They find that any
attempt to increase regulations on utilities negatively affects growth in employment, population,
personal income, and other economic indicators. This is due to the fact that efforts by utilities to
internalize externalities result in increased production costs. Ultimately, part of the economic
burden is transferred to consumers. Harrison (2008) suggests that complying with the NAAQS
increases the financial burden of businesses and results in lower regional gross domestic product;
loss of jobs; reduction in population; and loss of tax revenue.
Other studies adopt a different perspective and examine the impact of pollution on
productivity and learning ability. Margulis (1992) examines the impacts of air quality on the
economy of Mexico City and argues that air pollution, particularly particulate matter and ozone
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concentration negatively affect a person‟s productivity and learning ability. He finds that particulate matter is the most damaging pollutant in Mexico City and causes significant economic
losses through increased mortality, workday losses, and reduced productivity. He estimates that
the annual cost of particulates in the air is $850 million and the related health costs $1.1 billion.
Margulis‟ findings are consistent with a growing body of work that links air pollution to chronic
and acute health problems and premature death (e.g., Ostro, 1983; Wadell, 1974).
The influence of environmental regulation stringency on firm location decisions has also
received considerable attention. To some extent, this has been precipitated by increased interstate
economic competition. Condliffe and Morgan (2009) examine the impact of county-level
attainment status (as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency) on plant births of polluting
manufacturing firms. Their results indicate that stringent environmental regulation impacts
pollution-intensive capital flows by deterring new plant births and conclude that this affects
economic growth. More generally, they find that the impact of stricter environmental regulation
varies by pollution intensity of manufacturers.
Similarly, List and McHone (2000) examine the effects of air quality regulation on the
location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants in New York counties. They find
that enforcement of the federal air quality standards has a significant effect on location decisions
of new pollution-intensive plants. Their results also indicate that capital flows were diverted to
counties with less stringent environmental regulation, a finding that supports the “race to the
bottom” hypothesis.
In spite of anecdotal evidence supporting the race to the bottom hypothesis, some
economists are critical of its validity (e.g., Millimet and List, 2003; Potoski, 2002). They
conclude that environmental regulation stringency has no impact on firm location decisions and
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productivity. Dean, Brown, and Stango (1999) examine the impact of environmental regulation
stringency on the formation of manufacturing establishments and find no effect on the establishment of large manufacturing firms. However, regulation discourages smaller manufacturing
establishments from locating in areas with stringent regulations.
2.4 Determinants of Regional Growth
Because of the importance of state and local governments in structuring and financing
economic development it is critical for policymaker to understand the factors that explain
differences in states‟ economic growth. As Kale (1984, p. 31) observes, “the concern over state
development incentives will probably intensify, both regionally and nationally as the federal
government cuts taxes and the states are left to shoulder an increasing tax burden.” These
sentiments reflect the challenges that state policymakers continue to face while trying to find
ways of stimulating regional growth and development. Within this context, regional economists
have determined that public policy, human capital, political factors, wages, environmental
quality, industrial mix, amenities, including other socio-economic indicators play an integral role
in regional growth and development.
Previous studies have measured growth and development using population, total
employment, personal income, per capita income, and gross state product (Goetz, 1996; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Carlino and Mills, 1987; Deller et al., 2001). At the regional level, a
number of studies use simultaneous equations models to empirically test the “people follow jobs
and jobs follow people” hypothesis. Another dimension added to these growth studies is the
recognition that space plays a significant role in the variations among regional economies.
Because of this, spatial econometric models have been adopted to explain regional growth
disparities and dependencies across jurisdictions.
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Lundberg (2004) tests the hypothesis that the average income growth rate and net
migration rate in one municipality lead to spillovers that affect the growth rates of neighboring
municipalities. Lundberg finds a positive correlation between net migration rates in neighboring
municipalities, suggesting that there is a spillover effect across neighboring municipalities.
Likewise, Lundberg finds that an increase in the average income level in one municipality spills
over into jurisdictions and affects their average income growth rates.6
Kunce (2006) employs panel estimation techniques to analyze the factors that influence
growth in state manufacturing employment in the U.S. for the period 1974-1994. The model
includes five key policy variables as explanatory variables: highway miles, union membership,
pollution abatement expenditures, tax effort, and right to work. Recognizing that pollution
control costs can be determined endogenously with firm location patterns, Kunce splits the data
into five periods. While some policy variables reveal counter-intuitive results, the overall results
show that pollution control expenditures, the state‟s tax effort, and union membership negatively
affect employment growth. In addition, Kunce‟s results show that a state‟s infrastructure and
right-to-work laws positively influence employment growth.
Plaut and Pluta (1983) examine the relationship between business climate and industrial
growth. They argue that a good business climate is characterized by low state and local taxes,
right to work, little union activity, and a cooperative governmental structure. They specify a
three equation model for industrial growth represented by change in real value added, change in
employment, and change in capital stock and use various explanatory variables that include
climatic conditions. They find that tax effort, hot-humid weather, union activity and cost of land
are negatively related to growth in real value-added, employment, and capital stock, while
6

Numerous studies have emphasized the importance of strategic policymaking. For example, Case, Hines, and
Rosen (1993) show that a state government‟s spending is positively influenced by expenditure levels of its neighbor
while Brueckner (2000) discusses the role of strategic competition in relation to welfare benefits across jurisdictions.
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unemployment rates positively influence growth in employment and value-added. Plaut and
Pluta also find that property taxes, wage rate, total education expenditure, cost and availability of
land are positively related to growth in value-added, employment, and capital stock. In addition,
their study shows that labor-related and climate factors are important determinants of state output
and employment growth.
Goetz et al. (1996) develop an income growth model of the 50 U.S. states that includes
state environmental regulations, initial levels of income, environmental quality, education, percent of jobs in nine sectors, and poverty rate. Goetz et al. find that there is convergence in
income as revealed by the negative coefficient on initial income. On the other hand, the impact
of education on income growth reveals a counter-intuitive effect, indicated by the negative
coefficient for education. Other results show that state environmental regulations and environmental quality have a positive effect on income growth. The percent of jobs in each of the nine
sectors markedly shows different impacts on income growth, with construction, manufacturing,
transportation, fire, and service sectors having a positive relationship with income growth. This
can be explained by the fact that these sectors are high paying and account for a large share of
employment in some parts of the U.S. The study also concludes that strict environmental
regulations impose costs on polluting facilities, which in the short-run negatively affect
economic growth, but in the long-run have a positive effect thanks to improved environmental
quality.
A recent research by Mojica (2009) is related to the general economic development
problem of the Appalachian region. She uses a regional growth model to analyze the impact of
entrepreneurship on economic growth, but her model does not take into account spatial spillovers. The model implicitly tests for convergence by including initial conditions of the depen-

32

dent variables as explanatory variables. Mojica measures entrepreneurship using proprietorship
and firm births and deaths data. Results from the population equation show that employment
growth, firm birth, and entrepreneurship positively affect population growth while firm deaths
shows a negative relationship. Similar to Carlino and Mills (1987) and Deller et al. (2001),
Mojica finds that employment growth is positively influenced by population growth and per
capita income growth. This suggests that income, population, and employment play an important
role in regional growth. Mojica‟s results also show that population growth and firm death
negatively affects per capita income growth.
Gebremariam et al. (2007) utilize a non-spatial and spatial growth equilibrium model to
analyze the interdependences among employment growth, in-migration, out-migration, local
public expenditures, and median household income for 410 Appalachian counties. The five
dependent variables are regressed against a vector of independent variables and the initial
conditions of the dependent variable. Gebremariam et al. find that income growth positively
influences employment growth, but is negatively related to initial conditions of employment.
Accordingly, an increase in income creates wealth and this leads to increased consumer demand
for goods and services, which in turn stimulates formation of small businesses. He also finds that
the proportion of population employed in manufacturing and the per capita income tax are
negatively related to small business employment growth. Other results show that growth rate of
in-migration strongly depends on employment growth rate, median household income, and direct
local expenditures. This supports the hypothesis that counties which are experiencing growth in
employment and incomes will have more in-migration. Results also indicate that there is
convergence in out-migration growth rate and that employment growth rate positively affects
income growth, while in-migration is negatively related to income growth.
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Li (2006) utilizes a regional growth equilibrium model to analyze the impact of
environmental regulations and economic policies on population and employment growth in U.S.
counties. Li employs a non-spatial and spatial simultaneous regional growth model that includes
various explanatory variables such as population density, amenity index, regional dummies, air
quality, manufacturing concentration, fiscal variables, taxes, human capital, and other relevant
regional variables. Li determines that environmental regulations and economic policies are
endogenous in the employment equation. Therefore, to circumvent simultaneity bias Li utilizes
instrumental variables. Results reveal that population growth has a positive effect on
employment growth and vice versa, supporting the hypothesis that people follow jobs and jobs
follow people. Li‟s spatial model reveals that local environmental policies have a positive effect
on employment growth in metro counties and a negative effect on population growth, while
economic development policies have no effect on employment growth. Like previous studies, Li
finds that high crime rate, population density and per capita income tax retard population growth.
Using panel data, Helms (1985) investigates the effect of state and local taxes on
economic growth. He specifies a single equation model where economic growth is measured by
state personal income. Helms find that taxes have different effects on business activity depending
on how tax revenues are spent. He contends that if the tax revenues are used to redistribute
income, economic growth will be negatively affected, while if taxes are used to improve public
capital and human capital, taxes will be positively related to economic growth.
Helms‟ finding of the importance of infrastructure investment in economic growth is
supported by Jones‟ (1990) work. Jones examines economic growth in relation to state‟s public
spending policies on education, highways, welfare, police and fire services, and health/ hospitals.
He finds that spending on welfare and health/hospital negatively affects economic growth while
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spending on police/fire services, education, and highways positively influences economic
growth. These results are consistent with the theory that infrastructure development policies can
be effectively used to stimulate economic development. Munnell (1990) has done similar work
on the impact of public infrastructure on the productivity. Munnell finds a statistically significant
positive relationship between public capital investment and the level of labor productivity.
Munnell also finds that public capital positively influences employment growth and explains that
public investment in roads enables private companies to produce their goods at a lower cost.
Pagoulatos et al. (2002) use a three equation disequilibrium adjustment model to explore
the interactions among changes in employment, earnings per worker, and pollution per square
mile for 3,036 U.S. counties. They find that counties with high initial levels of employment,
pollution per square mile, and per worker earnings correspondingly experienced lower
employment, pollution, and earnings growth. In addition, their results reveal that employment
growth is deterred by union involvement, high energy and land costs. Not surprisingly, counties
with higher pollution levels are found to experience slower employment growth but faster
growth in earnings per worker. This reinforces the notion that workers residing in highly polluted
counties will demand higher wages. In addition, this finding counters the theory which suggests
that employment growth is associated with high pollution. By and large, the findings of
Pagoulatos et al. support the hypothesis that better environmental quality is associated with
higher employment growths. A growing number of empirical studies emphasize that environmental quality and amenity attributes play important roles in growth and development.
Evidence of the importance of environmental quality comes from Tannenwald (1997)
who asserts that the central objective of environmental regulations is to promote economic
welfare through the internalization of externalities. Tannenwald adds that internalization of the
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externalities can enhance a jurisdiction‟s attractiveness as a place to live, work, vacation, and
establish businesses. As such, workers and executives may be willing to sacrifice for monetary
compensation in order to work and live in communities that have better air quality. To that end,
Tannenwald explains that a jurisdiction‟s dirty air can stunt economic growth in two basic ways.
In the first place, a jurisdiction‟s dirty air will make the area to be unattractive to workers,
thereby constrain labor supply and thus drive labor costs up. All else equal, profit maximizing
firms and utility maximizing individuals migrate to an area with better environmental quality and
this increases the labor supply and places downward pressure on wages. Secondly, the
jurisdiction‟s dirty air precipitates more stringent regulation, thereby increasing environmental
compliance costs for existing and new firms. However, considering that environmental regulations are more stringent on new plants, this will deter new plant establishment and thus retard
economic growth.
McGranahan (1999) develops an amenity index and relates it to employment growth. He
finds that for a period of 25 years employment growth is positively related to the natural amenity
index. By and large, McGranahan finds that high amenity counties have three times as many jobs
than low amenity counties. Like McGranahan, Deller et al. (2001) find five amenity attributes
that are positively related to economic growth. Deller et al. find that climate related attributes
strongly influence population, employment, and per capita income growth.
Along Similar lines, Kahsai (2009) utilizes a Spatial Durbin Model to analyze the
relationship between regional growth and amenity factors for counties in the northeast region of
the U.S. He uses a three-equation simultaneous growth model to account for the feedbacks
among income density, population density, and employment density. Kahsai employs various
measures of amenities, including other exogenous factors to explain changes in employment
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density, per capita income density, and population density. Results from the non-spatial model
indicate that amenity factors positively influence population growth. Kahsai finds that only landbased and water-based amenities positively influence employment growth and per capita income
growth, respectively. Kahsai‟s spatial analyses complement findings by Hailu (2006) by showing
that county employment growth is not only affected by own-county socio-economic factors, but
also by those of neighboring counties. These findings underscore the importance of utilizing
spatial models that take into account interdependences among spatial units in order to explain the
impacts of neighborhood characteristics on the variations in regional growth.
Building on Krugman‟s (1991) model, Hosoe and Naito (2006) examine the impact of
environmental damage on the urban structure using an economic geography model of two
regions. In this model, they show that agglomeration economies affect the productivity of other
sectors via water pollution and air pollution. They argue that equilibrium distribution of
population in one region relative to another depends on the pattern of environmental damage. To
test this hypothesis, they consider a situation where there is transboundary pollution between two
regions. In their analysis, an environmental tax is imposed on manufactured goods produced in
one region, while the other region does not control for pollution. Their findings show that the tax
policy leads to a decrease in population in the region without environmental controls because the
region with environmental controls results in improved environmental standard. The findings by
Hosoe and Naito are consistent with studies that have shown that environmental quality has a
direct impact on population migration.
A study by Templet (1995) analyzes the relationship between risky environmental conditions (such as presence of high pollution-intensive plants) and economic performance in U.S.
states. Templet finds a negative relationship between environmental risks and economic
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performance. The results reveal that states with a large number of pollution-intensive plants
exhibit greater poverty, higher unemployment, lower retail sales growth, greater number of
business failures, and lower personal income. This means that neighborhood characteristics
influenced environmental outcomes.
In summary, the last 30 years produced many studies providing insights in the factors
underlying differences in regional growth. Findings overwhelmingly show that education,
infrastructure investment, industry mix, taxes, environmental characteristics, amenity attributes,
including state economic policies play an integral role in economic development. Therefore,
inclusion of policy variables like environmental regulations in regional growth models is highly
relevant in order to determine economic outcomes. Unfortunately, growth effects of local
economic and environmental regulation policies have not been examined in a manner which
takes into account all the feedback effects. In this regard, no empirical effort has been rendered
to examine the interdependences among employment, income, population, and environmental
regulations in a simultaneous framework.
This study resolves the issue regarding endogeneity bias discussed in the introduction to
this chapter by utilizing a regional growth model that takes into account the feedback
relationship among environmental regulation stringency, income, population, and employment
changes. In addition, many of the previous studies on the environmental regulations-economic
growth relationship have been done at state level, consequently failing to capture the
heterogeneity at local levels. This study fills that gap by conducting the empirical analysis at the
county-level.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
3.0

Introduction
Interactions between economic growth and the environment have been modeled using

growth models which typically view the environment as an input in the production function and
which explore the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality (Smulders,
2000; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Broadly, these studies show that economic growth and the
environment interact in a number of ways. In the first place, the environment provides the basic
inputs for production and consumption and this subsequently leads to economic growth.
Secondly, the environment will act as a sink for wastes generated from economic activities of
production and consumption—thereby intensifying the problem of environmental degradation.
For instance, air pollution emanating from sources such as transportation systems, production
activities, and so forth, will arguably affect society‟s economic and social welfare.
Viewed in this manner, the degradation of the environment lowers the utility of
consumers as well as diminishing the productivity of factors. Hence, because of the amenity and
productive values associated with the environment, this may result in society‟s preference for a
clean environment (Smulders, 2000). Conceptually, environmental quality cannot be sustained
without any form of intervention. Within the framework of endogenous growth theory, long-run
growth rates are affected by government policies such as taxation and regulation (Xepapadeas,
2000). As a consequence, a modern approach to endogenous growth theory suggests that sound
environmental standards promote economic and social welfare by correcting for externalities
generated from production and consumption activities. Another recurrent theme in the
endogenous growth theory is that environmental regulations provide a strong stimulus for
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technological progress and stress that technological progress is the engine to economic growth
(Romer, 1990). The argument is that investments in physical capital and other man-made
productions play important roles in expanding the available factors of production, and to the
subsequent growth in output.
3.1 Short-Run and Long-Run Impacts of Environmental Regulations
To formalize the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship, particularly
how environmental regulations affect economic growth in the short-run and long-run, let us
assume that a representative manufacturing firm in the economy uses a Cobb-Douglas
technology to produce aggregate output . The production function uses productive capital stock
, effective labor

and an aggregate of raw materials

, as inputs. Formally, the production

function is specified as:
(3.1)
Labor and capital are assumed to be substitutable while technological change is endogenous and
there are constant returns to scale. Other assumptions made are that the inputs contribute nonnegatively to production:

,

Arrow et al. (1995) point out that the flow of emissions per time unit is related to production
output, hence the environmental quality function is specified as:
(3.2)
In equation (3.2),
output, and

denotes the unit emissions coefficient, or simply emissions per unit of

is environmental quality. In this formulation, emission reduction technologies are

not incorporated and thus, it can be deduced that environmental quality
. This means that increases in the use of production technology
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is decreasing in

and

as well as use of raw

materials

lead to changes in output and environmental quality. This raises the question whether

a tradeoff exists between environmental quality and economic growth.
To examine the possible tradeoff between environmental quality and economic growth,
the concept of the transformation frontier suggested by Crissman et al. (1997, p. 27) is adopted.
Crissman et al. use the transformation frontier concept to show how government intervention
through environmental policies and adoption of abatement technologies affects the relationship
between agricultural production output and environmental quality. Figure 3.1 presents the
tradeoff curve that captures the relationship between manufacturing production,

and

environmental quality, .
Following the specifications of the production function in equation (3.1),

in figure 3.1

represents the production technology that does not incorporate pollution abatement efforts, which
produces

units of output—with a corresponding air quality standard (or environmental

quality) of

. In the short run,

is fixed and thus the only variable inputs used in production

are labor and raw materials. This means that an increase in the use of raw materials, , will result
in more output and more pollution, or equivalently a decline in environmental quality. According
to figure 3.1, production of

will result in emission of pollutants which exceed the federal air

quality standards, and this will lead to an areas‟ designation of the non-attainment status.
One way of preventing accumulation of ambient pollution levels in this model is to allow
for adoption of cleaner technologies that have the ability to enhance productivity and reduce
pollution. Within this context, imposition of a restrictive environmental policy will compel
polluting firms to adopt abatement technologies which decrease the flow of emissions (or
improve environmental quality). Assuming that

is the pollution abatement technology

adopted by the polluting firm, figure 3.1 shows that the short-run effect of environmental
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regulations is an improvement in environmental quality and reduced output. In the short-run,
output falls from

to

, while environmental quality increases from

to

.

Theoretically, this means that firms in the short-run will incur higher production costs due to
investments in abatement technologies, and accordingly, the diversion of resources from
production and investment activities will lead to slower economic growth. The reduced output
(

) represents the opportunity cost of environmental regulations that result in improved

environmental quality relative to forgone output.

Figure 3.1: Tradeoff Relationship Between Environmental Quality and Manufacturing Output
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In the medium-term and long-term, firms invest in other productive technologies as well
as in human capital that effectively augment output from
quality from

to

to

and improves environmental

. Within this context, technological progress enables firms to lower

the marginal cost of pollution control, and this allows firms to produce more with less pollution.
Figure 3.1 shows that in the long-run, adoption of abatement technologies by firms makes it
possible that a region‟s air quality is in compliance with the federal air quality standards−leads to
the attainment status (

)−and still allows firms to increase output from

to

.

The above model shows that economic growth and environmental quality can be
reconciled by allowing for technological progress. This view is supported by endogenous growth
theories which posit that environmental regulations generate external effects which enhance
productivity and long-run growth (Barro, 1999; Romer, 1990). Similarly, Porter and van der
Linde (1995) argue that additional constraints placed on firms in the form of environmental
regulations can induce technological innovations that are capable of expanding production
possibilities. In this case, investments in pollution abatement technologies will lead to
environmental improvements inasmuch as enhance productivity of factors of production, and
thus lead to economic growth.
Because environmental policy imposes additional costs, profit-maximizing firms devote
more resources to R&D in order to be more competitive. R&D activities result in more
innovations in the form of new production methods, new products, and so forth (Romer, 1987;
Smulders and Gradus, 1996). Insights from endogenous growth theory also indicate that the
accumulation of knowledge plays an integral role in stimulating economic growth by offsetting
diminishing returns (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Smulders (1995) suggests that growth is
sustainable only if abatement has a knowledge dimension which allows for growth in production
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with constant pollution. Like Smulders, Barro (1999) explains that the engine of growth is the
accumulation of knowledge as this leads to R&D activities. Under these circumstances,
environmental regulations that encourage new technological development could improve
efficiency.
3.2 Environmental Quality and Economic Growth
The graphical analysis in the preceding section illustrates tradeoffs between environmental quality and economic growth and emphasizes the importance of technological innovation
in reconciling environmental quality with economic growth. It also forms the basis for analyzing
the role of environmental quality in economic growth. Applying the insights from section (3.2),
we assume that, besides capital and labor, environmental quality plays an important role in
economic growth. Against that background, the production function in equation (3.1) is respecified to include environmental quality, , effective labor
capital

plus abatement technology

, and capital stock

(productive

) as factors of production. In this case, the appropriate

way of reducing emissions or improving environmental quality is to invest in two types of manmade capital stocks: productive capital,

and abatement technology,

. The production

function is expressed as:
(3.3)

; with

.

Differentiating equation (3.3) with respect to time, after re-arrangement, yields the rate of
technological progress, :
(3.4)
According to equation (3.4) economic growth

depends on capital growth, labor, and

environmental quality. Since environmental quality is an input in the production, it can be
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inferred that productive capital

and abatement technology

jointly determine the

environmental quality standard according to the following function:

With this

definition, the change in environmental quality can thus be specified as a renewable resource
given that it is affected by extraction of resources and production processes; however,
environmental degradation can be mitigated by putting in place environmental standards that
restrict extraction of resources and limits pollution from economic activities. Following
Xepapadeas (2000), environmental quality will evolve according to:
(3.5)
represents an environmental regeneration function and Z denotes reductions in environmental quality due to emissions from economic activities. The regeneration function represents
nature‟s capacity to absorb pollution and renew itself (Xepapadeas, 2000). Emissions,
function of productive capital

and abatement technology

are a

.

Theoretically, without production emissions are zero

and environmental quality

is at its maximum. Thus, we can infer that the emissions function has the following properties:
(3.6)
Equation (3.6) shows that net emissions are increasing and convex in productive capital
stock,

, and decreasing and convex in abatement technology

The last equation indicates

that a given unit of abatement may become more efficient the more polluting capital there is
(Vogel, 1999). Ariga (2002) shows that the elasticities of environmental quality with respect to
productive capital and abatement technology play an important role in determining the growth
rate of the environment. For this reason, well-designed environmental regulations are presumed
to encourage technological innovation, while poorly designed regulations can inhibit

45

technological progress (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). This is the premise of the Porter
hypothesis.
A clean environment means that an area is attractive to new businesses and in-migrants.
In the long-run, this leads to economic growth. Goetz et al. (1996) assert that improved environmental quality has an amenity value, and therefore, has a positive effect on per capita income; it
also influences firms‟ and households‟ (workers) location decisions. If the health of workers
improves there is a further boost in labor productivity. This kind of relationship is illustrated in
figures 3.2 and 3.3, which captures the channels of transmission of environmental regulations to
economic growth.

Figure 3.2: Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Economic Growth
Net Attraction
of firms

Better Environmental
Quality

Attraction of Skilled
workers
Increased Productivity

Attraction of wealthy
retirees
Stricter Environmental
Regulations

[+]

Per capita income

[-]

Higher cost/lower
output

Adapted from Goetz et al. 1996

Figure 3.2 shows that the initial impact of environmental regulation is increased production costs, which result from the initial shocks of environmental regulation implementation;
this culminates into reduced production output as shown by the negative sign. However, since
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environmental quality can evolve as a renewable resource in the form shown in equation (3.1),
we deduce that investments in the environment in the form of abatement technology enhance the
absorption capacity of the environment
Figure 3.3: Long-Run Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Economic Growth

Net Attraction
of firms

Better Environmental
Quality

Attraction of Skilled
workers
Increased Productivity

[+]
Per capita income

[+]
Attraction of wealthy
retirees
Stricter Environmental
Regulations

[-]

[+]

Higher cost/lower
output

Lower Production
Cost/Higher output
Modified version of Goetz et al. (1996)

As illustrated in figure 3.3, the long-run gain of environmental regulation is reduced production cost for regulated firms and improved environmental quality. These effects have
multiplier effects in terms of attracting new firms, skilled workers, and wealthy retirees. In the
long-run, this affects the living standards of households by increasing per capita income and
improving the health of workers because of less exposure to environmental pollution. Therefore,
government measures that are designed to reduce pollution through environmental regulations
play a crucial role in promoting long-run economic growth.
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3.3 Environmental Quality and Optimal Growth
When discussing social optimization, it is apparent that environmental improvements will
affect the behavior of households in terms of consumption, investment rates, and therefore, the
pattern of economic growth. Assuming that a representative consumer derives utility from
consumption of goods

, and environmental quality,

an

individual‟s utility function can

be specified as:
(3.7)
Following Aghion and Howitt (1998), the utility function in equation (3.7) comes from
the family of isoelastic utility functions which reflect the case of perfect complementarity
(without any substitution) between produced goods, , and environmental quality,

. Formally,

this type of utility function will take the following CES structure:
(3.8)
In the above formulation, utility from consumption and environmental quality is assigned the
same weight (

and it is assumed that the utility function is strictly concave in

consumption , and environmental quality

according to the following functions:

(3.9)

.

The last property in equation (3.9) indicates that an improvement in environmental quality will
increase the marginal utility of consumption, and vice versa.
It was argued in the previous section that environmental improvements

will arise due to

investment in abatement technology which reduces emissions, . This entails that the aggregate
capital stock

consists of productive capital and abatement capital. Assuming that output

is used for consumption, , and invested in abatement activities,
accumulation function can be expressed as:
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or

the capital

(3.10)
Based on the utility function specified in equation (3.7), the social planner‟s problem is to choose
time paths for
(3.11)
where

and

that maximize the intertemporal utility function according to:
subject to:

is the discount rate,

and

,

is an indicator of environmental quality while

represents the

investment in man-made capital and abatement technology. The current value Hamiltonian is
defined as:
(3.12)
and

represent the co-state variables related to capital,

and environmental quality,

With differentiation, the following first order conditions are obtained:
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
Results in equation (3.13) show that the shadow price of environmental quality is equal to the
abatement cost represented by

times the shadow price of capital,

whereas the

conditions in equation (3.14) indicate that the shadow price of man-made capital is equal to the
marginal utility of consumption. Equations (3.16) and (3.17) capture the benefits of capital
investments and environmental improvements, respectively.
Endogenous growth theory shows that investments in productive capital lead to increased
productivity

and may also result in increased emissions. However, the

abatement technology incorporated in the model offsets emissions from production and thus
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results in environmental quality improvements. Environmental quality improvements in turn
positively affect consumer utility. As shown by Smulders and Gradus (1996), when environmental quality and consumption enter the utility function, balanced growth depends on two
conditions. First, consumption levels (or utility) should be non-decreasing, and second,
environmental quality should be increasing or improving. This also implies that the marginal
increase in consumption and environmental quality will increase utility. Thus the social optimum
entails that when environmental quality is used as input in the utility function, abatement
activities have to be undertaken in order to enhance social welfare.
It can be concluded that when environmental concerns are not addressed, long-term
growth will result in deterioration of the environment, and thus growth will not be optimal. In
this regard, increased output comes at the expense of reduced environmental quality; therefore,
indicating the incompatibility between economic growth and environmental quality. However,
this incompatibility can be ameliorated by imposition of environmental regulations which
explicitly translate into increased cost of production for polluting firms, a decline in output (in
the short-run) and improved environmental quality. In this manner, environmental quality
improvements can be influenced by adopting environmental regulations or by restructuring
production through the adoption of cleaner technologies. In accordance with endogenous growth
theory, environmental quality enhances productivity of factors of production, and positively
affects consumer welfare through the amenity and productive values; hence, in the long-run,
economic growth will improve. Under these conditions, it seems possible that economic growth
and environmental regulations can be compatible.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA DESCRIPTION
4.0

Introduction
Chapter three explored the theoretical relationships between economic growth and

environmental regulations. It was established that without any form of intervention, economic
activities can result in the degradation of environment and in turn affect productivity and social
welfare. In accordance with the endogenous growth literature, it was established that well
designed environmental regulations can be used to promote economic and social welfare by
correcting for the externalities. Within the context of the environmental Kuznets curve literature,
factors such as population density, income, industrial composition, and other socio-economic
indicators can influence the level of environmental pollution. This argument implies that factors
that influence the level of pollution also have a bearing on environmental regulation stringency.
In addition, because of spatial variations in economic activities, different locations will supply
different environmental regulations. From the concepts of utility and profit maximization, it is
conceivable that consumers and firms respond to spatial variations in environmental regulation
stringency, thereby resulting in different levels of population, employment, and income growth
across regions. In other words, the economic development impacts of environmental regulation
stringency will differ across sectors and jurisdictions.
From the foregoing discussion, the regional development impacts of environmental
regulations can be understood using regional growth models which emphasize the
interdependences of household residential and firm location choices. The underlying assumption
of these models is that jobs follow people and people follow jobs (Steinnes, 1982). The aim of
this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the empirical regional growth models for conducting the
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hypothesis tests outlined in chapter one and also to discuss the data types and sources. The rest of
the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 4.2 discusses models of regional
economic growth, taking the form of non-spatial regional growth model while section 4.3
extends the non-spatial model by introducing the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). Section 4.4
introduces a discussion on the data types and sources, including a discussion on the variables
used in the equations and their expected signs. The last section (4.5) provides an overview of the
estimation techniques to be used.

4.1 Non-Spatial Regional Growth Model (Model 1)
Since the development of causality models by Steinnes (1982) that tested whether jobs
follow people or people follow jobs, models of regional development have been specified to
reflect the interdependence between household residential choices and firm location decisions.
Carlino and Mills (1987) modified Steinnes‟ model by constructing a two-equation non-spatial
simultaneous model, which captured the interdependence between population and employment
changes. Deller et al. (2001) extended the Carlino-Mills model by specifying a three equation
simultaneous model which captured the interdependences among income, population and
employment change.
The premise of these regional growth models is that utility maximizing consumers
migrate in search of utility derived from the consumption of market and non-market goods, and
profit maximizing firms, on the other hand become mobile when looking for regions that have
lower production costs and higher market demand. As discussed in the theoretical chapter
(sections 3.3 and 3.4), the long-run gain of environmental regulation is improved environmental
quality and this has multiplier effects in terms of attracting new firms and workers, improved
productivity, increased income, and so forth. Within this framework, this study presumes that
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interdependences exist between income, employment, population, and environmental regulation.
Utility maximizing consumers and profit maximizing firms migrate to areas with better
environmental quality, which are a result of increased environmental regulation. Within the
neoclassical framework, households migrate in order to maximize their utility, and this migration
can be stimulated by wage or income differentials, including variations in the provision of public
goods and services.
Thus, this study extends Deller et al.‟s model by specifying a four-equation simultaneous
model. Like previous studies, it assumes that there is a lag-adjustment process between a change
in one of the endogenous variables and the other endogenous variables. In a general equilibrium
framework, population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are not only
interdependent upon each other, but will also interact with exogenous factors, including the
lagged values of the endogenous variables. The general form of the four-equation simultaneous
model representing the interactions among population (P), employment (E), income (Y), and
environmental regulations (ER) is specified as:
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
Where

represent equilibrium levels of population, employment, per capita

income, and environmental regulations, respectively in the

county;

represent a set of exogenous variables that have either a direct or indirect effect on population,
employment, income, and environmental regulations.
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Equations (4.1) through (4.4) state that equilibrium levels of population, employment,
income, and environmental regulations depend on actual population, employment, income, and
environmental regulations, including other exogenous variables in s . The general equilibrium
condition specified in equations (4.1) to (4.4) can be specified as a linear relationship in the
following manner:
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
It is assumed that endogenous variables are not fully adjusted and that the endogenous
variables adjust to equilibrium levels with substantial lags (Mills and Price, 1984). Following
this relationship, the distributed partial adjustment models for the equilibrium levels for
population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are specified as:
(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)
The subscript

refers to the initial conditions of the endogenous variables, which in this

case are the 1992 values;

P

,

E

,

Y

, and

ER

represent the speed-of-adjustment coefficients to

desired levels of population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation.
Adjustment coefficients are assumed to be positive and between zero and one.
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Equations (4.9) through (4.12) show that current employment, population, income, and
environmental regulations are dependent on their initial conditions and on the change between
equilibrium values and on its lagged values. After rearranging equations (4.9) to (4.12), we
obtain population, employment, income, and environmental regulation changes as shown below.
(4.13)
(4.14)
(4.15)
(4.16)
where

,
represents the change in population, employment income, and environmental

regulations, respectively. The changes in the endogenous variables are derived from the
difference between the 2007 observations and 1992 observations as shown below.
(4.17)
(4.18)
(4.19)
(4.20)
Substituting equations (4.13) through (4.16) into the right-hand side of equations (4.5), (4.6),
(4.7), and (4.8), respectively, adopting of linear forms, and replacing the right hand unobservable
variables, this results in the econometric model to be estimated. Thus, the proposed non-spatial
model to be estimated consists of a system of four simultaneous equations describing population,
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation changes, respectively. The nonspatial four systems of equations are specified as:

55

(4.21)
(4.22)
(4.23)
(4.24)

The dependent variables ∆POP, ∆EMP, ∆Y, and ∆ER denote county changes in population,
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation, respectively; where
represent the structural error terms, and

is a vector of exogenous

variables. The year 1992 is taken as the initial period (subscript t−1). As already discussed, the
lag adjustment models assume that the endogenous variables do not adjust instantaneously to
their equilibrium levels but rather over a period of time. Deller et al. (2001) point out that the
speed of adjustment to equilibrium levels is embedded in the coefficients α, β, and δ. Therefore,
equations (4.21) to (4.24) estimate the short-term adjustments of population, employment,
income, and environmental regulations to their long-term equilibrium levels of (P*, E*, Y*, and
ER*).
Millimet and Fredriksson (2002) show that state regulatory outcomes respond to
regulatory decisions in other states. Implicit in this discussion is that the stringency of environmental regulations in one jurisdiction is a function of the level of environmental regulations in
another jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, it is probable that pollution levels in a given
area will be influenced by pollution levels in a neighboring area due to the transboundary
problem of pollution, and thus the stringency of county environmental regulations are likely to
exhibit spatial dependence. In addition, LeSage and Fischer (2009), point out that spatial
56

dependence is a common phenomenon in regional growth analysis, particularly with regard to
variables such as per capita income, population, and employment levels. Thus, the major
shortcoming of the models outlined in equations (4.21) through (4.24) is the lack of consideration of the cross-sectional spatial dependences, as environmental outcomes and growth
outcomes in one county may be related to outcomes and activities in adjacent counties.
Therefore, equations (4.21) through (4.24) need to take account of the spatial spillovers.

4.2 Spatial Model of Regional Growth (Model 2)
Despite the fact that the EPA has the overall responsibility for the implementation of U.S.
air quality regulations, the CAA gave U.S. states the mandate to implement and enforce federal
air quality regulations. Accordingly, each state is required to develop a state implementation plan
(SIP) outlining how federal air quality standards are going to be achieved. As consequence, it is
conceivable that the state‟s discretion in developing implementation plans will inevitably result
in differences in environmental stringency across the U.S. states. The concern with this
decentralized approach is that when states are faced with intense interstate economic
competition, states have the incentive to relax environmental regulations in order to attract
capital investment (Engel, 1997; Konisky, 2007). The result is that states may engage in strategic
regulatory competition when setting environmental standards. This means that states will take
into account the level of environmental regulations existing in neighboring states when setting
their environmental standards in order to gain economic advantage over other states.
Overall, the interactions between environmental regulations and economic growth
suggest that there is spatial dependence associated with environmental regulation stringency and
economic growth outcomes across regions (Anselin et al. 2004). For example, an improvement
in air quality in one county is likely to benefit neighboring counties and this may improve the
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attractiveness of the area for investment and retirement relative to other areas. This series of
events may result in increased population, income, and employment in the area with improved
environmental quality. In the presence of spillovers, Anselin (1988) points out that ignoring
spatial dependence in econometric modeling leads to inefficient or biased estimates and spurious
inferences. Anselin (1988) shows that OLS estimation produces inconsistent results.
This means that the simultaneous equations specified in (4.21) through (4.24) should be
estimated by incorporating spatial dependencies. The two most widely used econometric
approaches for incorporating spatial dependencies are the spatial error model (SEM) and the
spatial lag model (SLM). The SEM assumes that spatial dependence is caused either by
unmeasured variables that are correlated across space, which results in omitted variable
misspecification error, or the use of spatial data that does not match with the actual behavioral
units being studied (Anselin, 1998). Thus, the general assumption is that the spatial errors across
different units are correlated—thus violating the OLS assumption, and thereby making OLS
estimates inefficient and biased.
(4.25)

,

Where y is the

vector of dependent variables,

exogenous variables,

is the

is the

matrix of observations on

vector of unknown parameters, and

is the disturbance term

that follows:
(4.26)

and

is the
and

is an

spatial weighting matrix of known constants,

is the spatial error coefficient,

vector of innovations. The interpretation of the SEM is that the outcome in

region depends on the observed exogenous factors of region

and the error term,

depends

on the average of the error terms in neighboring regions and an idiosyncratic component defined
58

as

in (4.26). Theoretically, this type of problem can be eliminated by including proper

explanatory variables, or the use of correct spatial boundaries (Anselin, 1988). However, it is not
possible to include all relevant explanatory variables, and this typically results in the inclusion of
irrelevant variables.
On the other hand, the spatial lag model (SLM) assumes that the value of the dependent
variables of an area is dependent on the weighted average of the dependent variable of other
nearby areas Thus, the SLM assumes that the value of the dependent variable of an area
dependent on the weighted average of the dependent variable of another area

is

and that there are

no omitted variables. The implication is that the error terms are homoskedastic, as shown in
equation (4.27) below.
(4.27)

, with

y is the

vector of observations of the dependent variable,

spatial dependence

,

is the

connectivity between regions,
and

is the

is the

represents the strength of

weight matrix that specifies the spatial structure or
matrix of observations on

exogenous variables,

vector of regression disturbances and assumed to have a normal distribution

with mean of zero. Since the matrix

specifies the spatial dependence structure among the

observations, it is that assumed that

when observation

observation , and where there is no connectivity between regions

is a spatial neighbor to
.

Since it is not possible to include all relevant explanatory variables in a model and
because dependent variables may exhibit spatial dependence, LeSage and Pace (2009) explain
that the correct model to use is one that includes both a spatial lag of the dependent variable and
a spatial lag of the explanatory variables. In the spatial econometrics literature, this type of
model which incorporates both the spatial lag of the dependent variable and the spatial lag of
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exogenous variables is known as a spatial Durbin model (SDM). LeSage and Fischer (2009)
assert that the ability of the spatial Durbin model to deal with the problem of omitted variable
bias and spatial dependences make it a better choice over other spatial econometric models. The
spatial Durbin model can be expressed as:
(4.28)

, with

The notations for the variables

,

are defined in (4.27) while

represents a

vector that shows the strength of the relationship for each explanatory variable in the
matrix. The matrix

is the spatial lag of explanatory variables and reflects the characteristics

of explanatory variables related to neighboring regions.
The use of the SDM implies that economic growth and environmental regulations
county

of

are dependent upon the neighboring county‟s economic growth and environmental

regulations

, as well as the county‟s own explanatory variables plus the average of the same

explanatory variables of nearby counties. Following the above discussion, the spatial Durbin
model to be estimated is expressed as follows:
(4.29)

(4.30)

(4.31)

(4.32)
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is the

identity matrix, the terms

and explanatory variables, while
In particular,

represent the spatial weights of the dependent

denotes the spatial dependences of the dependent variables.

measures the strength of the spatial dependence or the level of influence from

neighboring regions‟ growth rates. The explanatory variables included in the spatial Durbin
model validly remain the same as those specified in the non-spatial model.
LeSage and Pace (2009) explain that interpretation of the SDM model differs from
conventional non-spatial regression in that the SDM model takes into account the spatial
spillover effects arising from a change in the variable

(contained in the

variables) in one county with respect to the change in

vector of exogenous

in other counties. LeSage and Pace

assert that the spatial connectivity relationships incorporated in the spatial Durbin model entail
that a change in the explanatory variable in one region directly impacts the region where changes
emanate from, also indirectly impacts other nearby regions. They show that the partial derivative
that takes into account the effect of changes in the dependent variable
changes on the variable

in region can be expressed as a

in region

due to

matrix, as shown below:

(4.33)
and

represent the coefficient parameter coefficients,

is the

main diagonal of the partial derivatives, and represents the direct effects of the impacts arising
from own-county changes in the variable
change in

To be more precise, the direct effects represent the

in a particular county due to a change in a county‟s own explanatory variables.

LeSage and Pace (2009) also explain that the row sum of the off diagonal terms produce the
indirect effects (spatial spillovers) and these are associated with the marginal effects of the firstorder, second-order, third-order neighbors, etc. Another important interpretation offered by

61

LeSage and Pace (2009) is that of the total effect, which is defined as the sum of the direct and
indirect effects.
Following LeSage and Kirby (2009), the relative impacts of the spillover effects in this
study are presumed to be influenced by the spatial proximity of counties, the degree of
connectivity between counties reflected by the matrix
parameter coefficients

and

, the magnitudes of the coefficient

and the strength of the spatial dependences, denoted by . This

can also be construed to mean that there is a decay of influence in terms of spillover impacts as
the distance between counties increases.
4.3 Data Description
The data are for counties in the Appalachian region and cover the years 1992 to 2007.
The dependent variables used in the models are measured as absolute changes in population,
employment, income, and environmental regulations (1992-2007). Table 4.1 gives the
description and sources of the endogenous variables and the initial condition variables used.
County-level data for population, employment, and income are obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System (REIS) and County and City Data
Book (C&CDB) covering the years 1992 to 2007. County attainment status is used as a proxy for
environmental regulation stringency and the data will be obtained from the Federal Code of
Regulations, Title 40, part 81, subpart C, covering the years 1992 to 2007.
Given that a county can be out-of-attainment with respect to several air pollutants, the
environmental regulation variable is an index of the total number of pollutants for which a
county is out-of-attainment. The environmental regulation index is constructed using
Henderson‟s (1997) methodology of summing the number of criteria pollutants a county is outof-attainment. The criteria pollutants considered are ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon
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monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), and total suspended particulates (TSP). Following Henderson (1997)
and List (2001), the attainment variable takes on values from 0 (cleanest county and least
regulated) to 5 (dirtiest and most regulated)—and generally depends on the number of pollutants
the county is out-of-attainment. For example, a county in attainment for five criteria pollutants
takes on a value of 0, whereas a county out-of-attainment in all five criteria pollutants will be
coded 5. With regard to the ozone standard, when part of the county has not met the complete
federal ozone standard, the EPA assigns to these counties partial attainment or non-attainment
status. For this reason, counties which are in partial attainment are coded ½. The year 1992 is the
start period for analysis.
Table 4.1: List of Endogenous Variables and Initial Conditions
Endogenous
Variable
POPCH

Change in population (1992-2007)

Computed:

PCICH

Change in Per Capita Income (1992-2007)

Computed:

EMPCH

Change in total employment (1992-2007)

Computed:

ENREG

Change in attainment status (1992-2007):
0= attainment, ½ to 5= number of
pollutants out-of-attainment

Computed:

POP92

County population in 1992

REIS/C&CDB

PCI92

County Per capita income in 1992

REIS/C&CDB

EMP92

County Employment in 1992

REIS/C&CDB

ENREG92

County attainment status in 1992

CFR, Title 40, Part 81, Subpart C and
EPA Green book

Description

Data Source

Initial Conditions

A number of explanatory variables are included to explain changes in population,
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Table 4.2 presents the description and
sources of all the exogenous variables included in the empirical models. For convenience, the
variables are divided into five distinct categories:
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a)

Accessibility variables
Accessibility variables include state road density (ROADDEN) and counties classified as

metro (METRO). State road density data reflect the level of infrastructure development and the
data comes from the Natural Resource Analysis Centre (NRAC) of West Virginia University
(WVU), while data on county classification comes from the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS).
b)

Human Capital variables
Human capital factors include proportion of population 25 years and above with

Bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE) and proportion of population between 18 and 64 years
(ACTIVE). All human capital data are obtained from the County and City Data Book (C&CDB,
1994).
c)

Economic Variables
Economic variables considered are per capita local government expenditure (LGEXP),

per capita taxes (PCTAX); poverty rate (POVRATE); property taxes (PROPTAX); manufacturing
establishments (MFG); percentage of employees working in manufacturing (MFGEMP); median
housing value (MHVAL); and unemployment rate (UNEMP) indicates whether the local
population is employable. Data on manufacturing establishments is obtained from the Business
Dynamic Statistics of the U.S. Census bureau (BDS). The BDS database contains data on
number of firms by category, age, size, and location, including key economic data such as
employment, number of establishments, and so forth. All other economic data are obtained from
the C&CDB.
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d)

Demographic variables
This group of variables include percentage of Black population (BLACK); proportion of

population below 5 years and proportion of population above 65 years (RISK); crime rates
(CRIME); and population density (POPDEN). Demographic data was obtained from the
C&CDB.
e)

Environmental Quality variables
To capture environmental quality, the following factors are used: presence of a Sierra

chapter in a county (SIERRA); votes cast for Democratic President in 1992 elections (VOTE);
USDA natural amenities index (AMEND); and percentage of population 16 and above driving to
work (POPDRIVE). Environmental quality data comes from different sources, including internet
searches. Data on county Sierra chapters was obtained from the Sierra Club Website, while data
on the amenity index comes from the USDA-ERS. The amenity index reflects individual‟s
preference for environmental quality and was constructed by combining six measures of climate,
topography, and water. Data on percent of votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate
and proportion of population considered to be risky comes from the C&CDB.
4.3.1 Population Equation
Specification of variables in the population equation follows economic theory and
existing literature. The dependent variable is the change in population (

), which is

defined as the difference between population in 2007 and population in 1992. The population
equation includes the initial conditions of the endogenous variables as explanatory variables.
This specification follows on the convergence hypothesis suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992), which suggests that there is a negative relationship between the growth in population
over time and the initial level of population. The implication of this negative relationship is that
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population growth in counties with higher population levels will be slower than counties which
have low population levels. The initial conditions of the endogenous variables include 1992
levels of population (POP92), employment (EMP92), and environmental regulations (ENVR92),
including the three endogenous variables of employment (EMPCH), per capita income (PCICH),
and environmental regulations (ENREGCH).
Environmental regulation stringency in this context refers to whether a county is inattainment or out-of-attainment. It is hypothesized that counties in attainment will experience
high population increases because of people‟s perceptions on improved environmental quality.
This might also mean that firms are going to positively view counties in attainment and hence
influence their investment decisions.
Other control variables in the population equation include fiscal factors such as per capita
income taxes (PCTAX), property taxes (PROPTAX), and per capita local government expenditure
(LGEXP). It is hypothesized that PROPTAX has a negative effect on population change, as this
represents an additional cost to households and firms, and thus deters in-migration while
encouraging out-migration. On the other hand, LGEXP is expected to have a positive effect on
population growth considering the fact that government expenditure increases provision of
public goods and services, such as highways, education, health, and other public safety services
(police, fire departments, etc.).
Other control variables for population change are the natural amenity index (AMEND),
county unemployment rate (UNEMP), median housing values (MHVAL), manufacturing
establishments (MFG), and accessibility variables, such as road density of state roads
(ROADDEN). Amenity variables (AMEND) are included in order to capture quality of life and
are expected to have a positive impact on population change. Counties with high unemployment
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rates (UNEMP) signal a limited number of economic opportunities available in the local
economy, and thus, the coefficient for unemployment rate is expected to be negative.
Housing values (MHVAL) are included in order to account for the cost of living, and thus
it is expected that high housing prices negatively affect population growth and, conversely, low
housing values positively influence population growth. State road density (ROADDEN) measures
the extent and coverage of the paved road infrastructure within a county and this is associated
with improved mobility, and thus may result in increased population.
Two variables are included to control for differences in growth patterns among counties,
a dummy variable (METRO) representing metropolitan counties and number of manufacturing
establishments in a county (MFG). It is hypothesized that metropolitan counties (METRO) and
counties with a high number of manufacturing establishments (MFG) experience faster
population growth due to the presence of agglomeration economies.
(4.34)

4.3.2 Employment Equation
Variables in the employment equation have been chosen for their ability to reflect longrun supply and demand conditions in the labor market in a given county. The dependent variable
in the employment equation is the change in employment (EMPCH) between 1992 and 2007.
Like the population equation, the employment equation includes the initial conditions of the
endogenous variables as explanatory variables, including the three endogenous variables of
changes in population (POPCH), per capita income (PCICH), and environmental regulations
(ENREGCH). The initial conditions included are 1992 levels of population (POP92), 1992
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employment conditions (EMP92), and environmental regulations (ENREG92). Past studies show
that higher initial levels of population positively affect employment growth.
Fiscal related control variables are included in order to determine their impact on
employment growth. Fiscal variables included in the employment are per capita local
government expenditure (LGEXP), property tax (PROPTAX), and per capita taxes (PCTAX).
Given that local government expenditures are associated with provision of public goods, it is
hypothesized that LGEXP is positively related to employment growth. The impact of taxes on
consumers is illustrated in Tiebout‟s (1956) work, which shows that a reduction in government
programs or an increase in taxes by a local jurisdiction results in out-migration and discourages
in-migration. Therefore, it is hypothesized that PROPTAX and PCTAX are negatively related to
employment growth.
Other important explanatory variables for employment growth are human capital factors.
Human capital variables included in the employment equation is the proportion of county‟s
population 25 years and over with a bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE). The proportion of
population of persons 25 and above is included in the equation in order to control for the effect
of labor force quality, with the assumption that a person with a college degree has higher skills
and knowledge which can be used to expand firms‟ production as well as entice other firms to
locate in the area. Also related to employment growth is the notion that the Democratic Party
pursues pro-employment policies (Levitt and Poterba, 1999). Percent of votes cast for the
Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) are used as a proxy for the Democratic Party‟s control
of the executive office. It is hypothesized that VOTE will be positively related to employment
growth.
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To account for labor availability, county unemployment rates (UNEMP) are included in
the employment equation. High unemployment rates generally indicate that the local economy is
in distress, which consequently discourage firms from locating to an economically depressed
county. Therefore, it is hypothesized that unemployment rate (UNEMP) is negatively related to
employment growth. Similarly, counties experiencing high crime rates may discourage firms
from locating there, and consequently affect employment growth. The variable CRIME is
included to account for the negative externality, and it is hypothesized that CRIME is negatively
related to employment growth.
Following the seminal work by Aschauer (1989), numerous studies (Carlino and Mills,
1987; Duffy-Deno, 1998; Munnell, 1990) have shed light on the impact of transport investment
on employment growth. Location theory suggests that provision of highway infrastructure
investment can significantly reduce marginal costs of production and consumption in a given
area by reducing the cost of transporting goods and services. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
interstate road density (ROADDEN) is positively related to employment growth.
Another measure of agglomeration economies included is the number of manufacturing
establishments (MFG). Within this context, it is hypothesized that manufacturing establishment
is positively related to employment growth.
(4.35)

4.3.3 Per Capita Income Equation
Variables in the income equation have been chosen based on their hypothesized
relationship to productivity gains, which translates into increased per capita income. The per
capita income equation is estimated as a function of endogenous variables, namely employment
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(EMPCH), population (POPCH), and environmental regulations (ENREGCH), including the
initial conditions of the endogenous variables, PCI92 and POP92.
Other variables included in the per capita income equation include per capita local
government expenditure (LGEXP), which measures provision of services and goods and is
assumed to be an important input in the development of human capital as well as productivity
improvement for manufacturing, agriculture, wholesale, and trade industries (Connolly and Fox,
2004). Therefore, it is hypothesized that local government expenditure is positively related to
income growth. Another fiscal variable included is the per capita income tax (PCTAX), a variable
whose impact on per capita income growth remains open. Therefore, no priori assumptions are
made with regard to the impact of PCTAX on income growth.
Natural amenities (AMEND) are presumed to explain income growth since they reflect
the quality of life available to the local population. Based on previous studies (Kahsai, 2009,
McGranahan, 1999), it is expected that AMEND has a positive relationship with income growth.
The literature shows that access to amenities attracts wealthy retirees, who subsequently increase
a given areas‟ per capita income. Another measure that has been used in previous studies to
explain income growth is the political party in control of the federal government. Levitt and
Poterba (1994) find evidence that show that states with a large share of Democrats in the House
of Representatives experience faster per capita income growth relative to those with fewer
democrats. To account for party control, the percentage of votes cast for the Democratic
presidential candidate in the 1992 elections (VOTE) is included, and it is hypothesized that
VOTE is positively related to income growth.
To capture the effects of demographic factors on income growth, the percent of
population 65 years or older is included to represent the retired labor force (RETIRE). Generally,
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the main source of income for retirees is social security benefits. Ceteris paribus, counties with a
high proportion of retired labor force experience slower income growth. On the other hand, the
active labor force represented by the proportion of population between 18 years and 65 years
(ACTIVE) derive most of their income from wage and salaried jobs. Thus it is expected that
ACTIVE is positively related to income growth.
High income growth is also associated with educational attainment as this increases an
individual‟s productive and entrepreneur knowledge and skills. To account for the impact of
education in income growth, proportion of population 25 years or older with a bachelor‟s degree
or higher education (DEGREE) is included. Another important measure that is hypothesized to
increase per capita income growth is the number of manufacturing establishments (MFG) present
in a county, due to its large labor demands.
The percent of population that is African Americans (BLACK) is included to control for
the relative impact of the black population on income. This variable has been widely used in
income inequality studies because of its ability to capture labor market discrimination which
results in lower wages (Garofalo and Fogarty, 1979). A negative relationship is hypothesized
between percent of population that is black and per capita income. Also, in order to explain
income growth, the percent of families living below the poverty rate (POVRATE) is included,
and ceteris paribus, counties with a high percentage of the population below the poverty line are
expected to experience slow income growth.
(4.36)
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4.3.4 Environmental Regulations Equation
The environmental regulations equation is estimated as a function of initial conditions for
environmental regulations and all endogenous variables, including the initial conditions.
Considering the fact that environmental quality has a high income elasticity of demand, the
coefficient for income is expected to be positive as will be the coefficients of population and
employment change.
Other control variables include the share of population under 5 years and above 65 years
(RISK). Share of population below 5 years and above 65 years is designed to capture the
population which is more susceptible to suffer from chronic illnesses due to environmental
exposures. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the proportion of the sensitive group of people results
in an increase in the demand for stringent environmental regulations. To control for urban or
metro effects, a metro (METRO) dummy variable is included and this accounts for the
congestion effects. Metro areas generally have an array of economic activities which rely on
trucks, trains, and cars for transportation of inputs and outputs to the markets. This high
concentration of economic activity may result in large emissions of pollutants, thereby increasing
the demand for stricter enforcement of environmental regulations. Thus the metro variable is
hypothesized to have a positive effect on environmental regulations stringency. In addition,
metro areas have a large presence of lobby groups, which means more pressure for stringent
environmental regulation.
Another demographic factor included as an explanatory variable is the percent of the
black population (BLACK) that controls for the marginal exposures to pollution. The
environmental justice literature documents that the African American population and Hispanic
population are marginally more exposed to environmental damages than the white population
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(Morrone, 2008; Sicotte, 2009).

Therefore, it is hypothesized that percentage of black

population (BLACK) is negatively related to environmental regulation stringency. Additional
evidence from the environmental justice literature indicates that the prevailing socio-economic
conditions of individuals and areas will influence environmental outcomes, and thus low income
and high poverty areas are associated with poor environmental quality. County poverty rates
(POVRATE) are included to control for economic condition, and it is expected that high poverty
rates are negatively associated with environmental regulation stringency.
Community/public activism towards environmental issues emanates from the population
that is susceptible to illnesses due to environmental exposure, as well as from environmental
pressure and other interest groups. The presence of Sierra Clubs in counties (SIERRA) controls
for community/public environmental activism. These groups are known to be pro-environment
and thus will exert pressure for stringent environmental regulations. Therefore, it is hypothesized
that the Sierra variable is positively related to enforcement of environmental regulations.
Additional pressure on environmental regulations comes from manufacturing workers
who may demand lower environmental standards in order to protect their jobs. In this case, a
negative relationship between manufacturing employment and environmental regulations is
found. However, when viewed from the perspective of a pollution-intensive sector, an increase in
manufacturing employment (MFGEMP) may imply an increase in environmental regulation
enforcements due to increased pollution. Therefore, the expected sign on MFGEMP can be
positive or negative as explained above.
Population density (POPDEN) controls for the congestion externalities, which imply that
densely populated areas lead to more waste generation, and thus it is expected that counties with
higher population densities positively influence environmental regulation stringency. Other
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control variables include proportion of persons 25 years and older with a bachelor‟s degree
(DEGREE) and proportion of population driving to work (POPDRIVE), and the state road
density (ROADDEN). The level of human capital development influences an individual‟s
interest, knowledge, and understanding of environmental issues, including the effectiveness of
the group to lobby against pollution. Thus, it is hypothesized that education (DEGREE) is
positively related to environmental regulation stringency.
Undoubtedly, employment growth and population growth entail increased usage of
vehicles, and given that vehicles are a major source of emissions which contribute to air
pollution it is hypothesized that the proportion of persons driving to work (POPDRIVE) will be
positively related to strict environmental regulations. According to Cassady (2004), highway
expansions have increased vehicle miles traveled and this has also resulted in increased emission
of pollutants due to changes in land use and neighborhood characteristics. State road density
controls for the traffic density and it hypothesized that state road density (ROADDEN) is
positively related to environmental regulation stringency.
Another measure which can explain environmental outcomes is political party ideology.
Previous studies show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is influenced by the
political party that controls the executive branch and legislature (Lynch, et al. 2004; Regens et
al., 1997). Accordingly, the Democratic Party is considered to be more supportive of stringent
environmental regulations than the Republican Party. To account for political ideology, the
percentage of votes cast for the democratic president (VOTE) in the 1992 election is included as
a proxy for environmental regulation preference for the elected officials. The variable VOTE is
hypothesized to be positively related to environmental regulation stringency.
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(4.37)

4.4 Estimation Methods
Because the equations specified in (4.34) to (4.37) are structural equations, three stage
least squares (3SLS) estimation will be used. 3SLS is preferred to two stage least squares (2SLS)
because of the possible correlation of the error terms, which is not addressed by 2SLS
estimation. Therefore, the advantage of using 3SLS is that it is a full information estimation
technique which takes into account information from other equations, and thereby producing
asymptotically efficient estimates than the two stage least squares (2SLS). However, Wooldridge
(2002) explains that when a system of equations is just-identified, 2SLS is algebraically identical
to 3SLS, and in this situation, both estimation techniques produce consistent and efficient
parameter estimates. The spatial Durbin model (SDM) represented by equations (4.29) to (4.32)
will be estimated using the codes contained in James LeSage‟s Spatial Econometrics MATLAB
toolbox.
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics of the exogenous variables and endogenous
variables used in the models. Columns 1 and 2 show the standard deviation and average values
of the variables, while columns 3 and 4 show the minimum and maximum values of the
variables. A perusal of column shows that the maximum number of pollutants that counties were
out of attainment is four. Out of the 410 counties, three counties were out-of-attainment for four
criteria pollutants (particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and ozone).
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Table 4.2: Description of Exogenous Variables
Exogenous
Variables

Description

Data Source

Human Capital Variables
ACTIVE

Percentage of population between 18 years and 64 years

C&CDB, 1994

DEGREE

Percent of persons 25 yrs & above with college degree

C&CDB/Computed, 1994

Demographic Variables
POPDEN

Total population/land area

REIS/Computed

RISK

Percentage of population below 5 years plus above 65

CC&CDB 1994

RETIRE

Percentage of population above 65 years

CC&CDB 1994

Economic Variables
PROPTAX

Per capita local property tax

MFG

Number of manufacturing establishments in a county

C&CDB, 1994
U.S. Census Bureau Dynamic
Business Series (DBS)

UNEMP

Percent of civilian labor force employed in
manufacturing
Civilian labor force unemployment rate (percent)

POVRATE

Percent of families with income below poverty rate

REIS/C&CDB, 1994

PCTAX

Local tax per capita, 1992

C&CDB, 1992

CRIME

Serious Crimes per 100,000 of population, 1992

C&CDB, 1992

MHVAL

County median housing value

C&CDB, 1994

LGEXP

Per capita local government expenditure

C&CDB, 1994

MFGEMP

REIS/C&CDB, 1994
REIS/C&CDB, 1994

Accessibility/Location Variables
METRO

Metropolitan counties, dummy variable=1, 0 otherwise

ROADDEN

Miles of state roads per square mile

USDA/ERS-Creative class
code
NRAC, WVU

Environmental Quality
AMEND

Natural amenities index

USDA/ERS

DRIVE

Percentage of population 16 and above driving to work

C&CDB, 1994

VOTE

Percentage of votes cast for Democratic President

C&CDB, 1994

SIERRA

Dummy: 1 = Sierra Chapters in a County, 0 otherwise

Sierra Club

POPDRIVE

Percentage of population above 17 years driving to work

C&CDB, 1992
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Name

STD

Mean

Min

Max

ACTIVE
AMEND
CRIME
DEGREE
EMP92
EMPCH
ENREG92
ENREGCH
LGEXP
METRO
MFG
MFGEMP
MHVAL
PCI92
PCICH
PCTAX
POP92
POPCH
POPDEN
POPDRIVE
POVRATE
PROPTAX
RISK
ROADDEN
SIERRA
UNEMP
VOTE

30.582
1.1632
1560.8
4.981
53959
13524
0.73343
0.647933
2344.7
0.44102
120.53
11.367
13528
2530.2
2152.3
160.88
89059
22862
133.03
5.3388
8.0139
17.519
2.6548
0.11601
0.46872
3.1947
10.065

62.61
0.13266
2251.9
10.498
25010
5453.5
0.329268
0.282926
3782.7
0.26341
67.824
26.236
47631
13630
10867
285.31
50945
6196.8
101.27
73.827
19.019
72.362
20.921
0.32637
0.67561
9.3524
42.386

0
-3.72
0
3.7
0
-6124
0
0
0
0
0
0
15800
0
0
0
0
-102000
6.33
51.9
0
0
0
0
0
3.4
17.1

456.04
3.55
8487
41.7
820000
203000
4
3
33391
1
1627
53.6
118000
22226
19917
1317
1340000
363000
1838.3
85.1
52.1
99.1
30.45
0.73933
1
22.6
82.8

In 1992, 22 of the 410 Appalachian counties were completely out of attainment for at least one
criteria pollutant. Between 1992 and 2007, this number increased to 89, representing a 75 percent
increase. A majority of these counties were out-of-attainment for the TSP and ozone standard.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES
5.0

Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to estimate the empirical models on the relationship between

environmental regulations and regional growth. Indicators for regional growth are per capita
income growth, population growth, and employment growth, while county attainment status is
used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. The models are estimated using two
techniques; three stage least squares and the spatial Durbin model (SDM). The rest of this
chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents a discussion on the results for the nonspatial model, while section 5.2 presents a discussion on the results for the spatial Durbin Model.
5.1 Non-Spatial Growth Model Results
Given that estimation of the non-spatial model involves four structural equations
represented by change in employment, population, environmental regulations, and per capita
income, it is highly plausible that the error terms in each equation are related. Consequently,
estimation by ordinary least squares will provide inconsistent and inefficient estimates. In order
to overcome this problem, full information estimation techniques such three stage least squares
(3SLS), GMM, or the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) have been suggested as
appropriate estimation methods because they take into account the restrictions on parameters in
all structural equations (Wooldridge, 2002). For the purpose of this study, three stage least
squares will be used for estimating the non-spatial structural equations (4.34 to 4.37) and
estimation will be done in Eviews. Tables 5.1 through 5.4 summarize the non-spatial structural
equation estimates.
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5.1.2 Change in Population Equation
Table 5.1 presents summary results for the population growth equation. The coefficient
estimate for the initial condition of population (POP92) has the expected negative sign and is
significant at the 1 percent level. This finding confirms the convergence hypothesis, which
suggests that counties which had initial high levels of population will tend to experience a lower
growth rate than counties which had low levels of population in the initial period. On the other
hand, the coefficient estimate for EMP92 is positive and is significantly different from zero. The
positive coefficient for EMP92 confirms the „jobs follow people‟ hypothesis.
Change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) has a positive impact on population
growth and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. One possible
explanation for this positive relationship between environmental regulations and population
growth may be that stringent environmental regulations result in improved environmental quality
and thus make local areas to become attractive for businesses and households. This argument is
similar to the one advanced by Goetz et al. (1996, p.100) who assert that when environmental
regulation results in improved environmental quality, growth rates may subsequently increase.
Change in employment (EMPCH) has a positive effect on population growth, indicating that an
increase in employment growth (or an increase in labor demand) stimulates population growth.
The coefficient for EMPCH is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and thus shows that
jobs follow people. Also, the role of per capita income change (PCICH) in explaining growth in
population is strong, as reflected by the magnitude and positive sign of the coefficient
(significant at the 5 percent level).
As hypothesized, the unemployment rate (UNEMP) has a negative effect on population
growth and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Generally, high unemployment rates
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indicate economic distress and a dearth of employment opportunities. Consequently, counties
with high unemployment rates discourage in-migration and conversely encourage out-migration.
These findings are consistent with results from past studies (Gebremariam, 2006; Mojica, 2009).
Estimated results also show that median housing values (MHVAL) and population growth have a
negative relationship, but the coefficient for (MHVAL) is not significant. Manufacturing
establishment (MFG) has an unexpected negative effect on population growth and its coefficient
is insignificantly different from zero. The negative coefficient may be due to the declining role of
manufacturing in the Appalachian economy. State road density (ROADDEN) appears to have a
positive effect on population growth, but is also insignificantly different from zero.
The estimated coefficient for local government expenditure (LGEXP) is positive and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that local government spending
programs that are aimed providing a mix of goods and services stimulate population growth in
that area. By contrast, per capita local property tax (PROPTAX) is negatively related to
population growth and its coefficient is insignificant at the 5 percent level. This finding
reinforces the notion that individuals avoid locating in jurisdictions with higher taxes. The
relationship between per capital local taxes (PCTAX) and population growth indicate a positive
relationship. This finding, definitely counters economic theory and it is not surprising that the
coefficient for PCTAX is statistically insignificant.
The coefficient for metropolitan location (METRO) is positive and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. The regression analysis also reveals a significant positive relationship
between the amenities (AMEND) and population growth. One possible explanation is that high
amenity counties provide a variety of recreation activities which create employment
opportunities for the local communities, and thus high amenity counties become attractive
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locations for business investment and households. These findings are consistent with results from
previous studies (Kahsai, 2009; McGranahan, 1999; Deller et al. 2001).
Table 2.1: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Population

Independent
Variable
POP92
EMP92
ENREG92
PCICH
EMPCH
ENREGCH
MHVAL
PCTAX
AMEND
PROPTAX
UNEMP
MFG
LGEXP
METRO
ROADDEN
CONSTANT
= 0.883053
N= 410

Expected Sign

Coefficient

+
-/+
+

-0.1479
0.6389
-0.0324
1.8852

0.0000
0.0030
0.1036
0.0016

+
-/+
+
+
+
+

2.0809
0.8429
-0.0084
3.0792
1760.273
-36.7472
-211.1728
-6.5621
1.2900
8401.985

0.0000
0.0148
0.7933
0.1915
0.0014
0.1856
0.0370
0.7137
0.0041
0.0006

+

2329.112
9013.233

0.5705
0.0019

-value

5.1.3 Change in Employment Equation
The estimated results for the employment growth equation are shown in table 5.2. The
initial condition for employment (EMP92) has a statistically significant and negative effect on
employment growth. The implication of this finding is that counties with initial low employment
levels in the 1990s are experiencing faster growth in employment than counties which had high
initial levels of employment. These results are consistent with findings from previous studies

81

(Gebremariam, 2006; Black et al., 2007) about the convergence in employment rates in the
Appalachian region. Black et al. (2007) attributes the convergence of employment in the
Appalachia to the wide diversification of the Appalachian economy. Accordingly, this
diversification has resulted in the growth of the service sector, retail sector, and growth in
government employment.
The estimated coefficient on initial conditions for population (POP92) is statistically
significant and positive, thus confirming the hypothesis that people follow jobs. An increase in
population entails a larger supply of labor. The interpretation of the results is that a 1 point
increase in population is associated with a 1.09 points increase in employment. The positive
effect of population on employment growth is supported by evidence from the Appalachian
Regional Commission which shows that between 2002 and 2004, there was a large of growth of
employment in both the Appalachia and the nation as a whole.7 Therefore, it is surmised that the
increase in population did not diminish employment opportunities, but rather was necessary to
meet the increasing demand for labor.
The coefficient on the initial condition for environmental regulations (ENREG92) has a
negative and statistically significant effect on employment growth. The plausible explanation for
this negative correlation is that, following the designation of counties as attainment or nonattainment in 1990, the EPA required states to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) at the
end of 1992, and therefore, between 1990 and 1992 polluting firms faced stringent measures with
regard to pollution control. This is an important finding because it reveals that stringent
environmental regulations negatively affect employment growth in the initial years of
implementation due to the fact that polluting firms have to install expensive pollution abatement
7

See Appalachian Region Employment Report on
http://www.arc.gov/images/appregion/AppalachianRegionEmploymentReport2009Q2.pdf
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control equipment. The effect of this may inadvertently be transmitted to other sectors of the
economy, which, consequently results in overall slow-down of total employment growth.
On the other hand, the coefficient on the change in environmental regulations
(ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results reinforce
the Porter hypothesis and show that firms‟ marginal costs of abatement may decrease over time
as firms invest in efficient technology. Therefore, the efficient technology firms invest in serves
the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental quality, such that areas
become important locations for businesses and households.
The coefficient on the change in population (POPCH) is statistically significant at the 1
percent level and is positively related to employment growth. This finding, again, confirms the
“people follow jobs” hypothesis espoused by Steinnes (1982). Similarly, change in per capita
income (PCICH) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is positively related to
employment growth. This means that Appalachian counties with high income experienced
increased growth in employment, and this could be attributed to the economy-wide
diversification that has taken place in the Appalachia.
Another variable that might be expected to affect labor demand is the percentage of the
population with a bachelor‟s degree or higher (DEGREE). The coefficient for DEGREE is
positive as hypothesized, but has no significant effect on employment growth. Conceptually,
metropolitan counties are expected to have high employment growths, but the coefficient for
metro counties (METRO) is negative and insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, state road
density (ROADDEN) does not appear to be an important explanatory factor for employment
growth.
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Local government expenditure (LGEXP) is also regressed against employment growth.
The coefficient estimate for local government expenditure (LGEXP) is positive as hypothesized
and is statistically significant (5% level). Another fiscal factor likely to affect employment
growth is the local tax per capita (PCTAX). The coefficient on local tax per capita (PCTAX) has
an unexpected positive sign, but statistically insignificant. The positive coefficient on PCTAX
counters economic theory, and can perhaps be construed to mean that an increase in the local tax
rate entails an increase in local government revenue; therefore, an increase in local government
revenue may entail provision of more services to the local communities. The last fiscal variable
is per capita local property tax (PROPTAX), and its coefficient is also insignificantly different
from zero.
Employment growth is also positively influenced by the number of manufacturing
establishments, as reflected by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for
manufacturing establishment (MFG). Unemployment rate (UNEMP) is negatively related to
employment growth and its coefficient is statistically insignificant. Another factor believed to
influence employment growth relates to political ideology. The percent of votes cast for the
Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) in the 1992 presidential elections is regressed against
employment growth. The estimated coefficient for VOTE is positive but highly insignificant.
The coefficient for the amenities index (AMEND) is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% percent level. This means that high amenities are associated with a decline in overall
employment growth. The negative correlation can be attributed to the fact that the amenities
index is a composite score which represents a variety of attributes and thus the importance of
individual attributes may be overshadowed. Another variable that has an unexpected sign is the
crime rate (CRIME), which has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. This positive
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correlation between crime rate and employment growth can be attributed to the fact that other
location factors available within counties are more important in stimulating employment growth
and thus may overshadow the negative externalities stemming from crime.
Table 5.2: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Employment

Independent
Variable

Expected Sign

Coefficient

-

-0.0638

0.0007

+/-

-0.0862

0.0000

POP92

+

1.0916

0.0000

PCICH

+

2.1597

0.0000

POPCH

-

0.4509

0.0000

+/-

0.5199

0.0000

DEGREE

+

14.5365

0.5409

LGEXP

-

0.7006

0.0037

PROPTAX

-

-7.3759

0.5747

UNEMP

-

-96.6829

0.1419

METRO

+

-2611.307

0.0655

MFG

+

22.7049

0.0103

AMEND

+

-764.2158

0.0038

CRIME

-

0.0171

0.8337

ROADDEN

+

606.3321

0.7850

PCTAX

-

2.4506

0.1145

VOTE

+

0.6503

0.9686

7389.006

0.0199

EMP92
ENREG92

ENREGCH

CONSTANT
= 0.8580
N = 410
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-value

5.1.4 Change in Per Capita Income Equation
Three stage least squares regression results for the per capita income equation are
reported in table 5.3. The estimated coefficient for initial condition for per capita income
(PCI92) is negative and its coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
negative coefficient for PCI92 confirms the convergence hypothesis, which suggests that
counties with lower incomes grow faster than higher income counties. Gebremariam (2006) and
Santopietro (2002) also find evidence of income convergence in the Appalachia. On the other
hand, the coefficient estimate for initial population (POP92) has a positive effect on per capita
income growth and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The interpretation of this
result is that initial levels of population are representative of labor supply and thus have a
positive impact on output and per capita income growth. Although this estimate for this variable
is statistically significant, its magnitude is relatively small.
The sign and level of significance for the initial condition for environmental regulation
(ENREG92) mirrors results obtained in the employment and population equations (negative and
significant at the 1 percent level). The interpretation of this result is that the extent to which
environmental regulations influence population growth depends on environmental regulations‟
direct effect on economic performance. Under this circumstance, it can be assumed that stringent
environmental regulations will initially negatively affect economic performance due to firms‟
investments in abatement technology, which subsequently reduces labor demand. This negatively
affects per capita income growth.
Except for the change in population (POPCH) variable, all growth factors (endogenous
variables) are significant in explaining growth in per capita income. Economic theory shows that
growth in employment (EMPCH) results in an increase in aggregate labor demand, and as a
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result, higher per capita income. The variable EMPCH has the correct positive sign and is
significant at the 5 percent level. These findings provide empirical evidence of the hypothesized
positive impact of employment growth on per capita income growth. Similar effects are also seen
with respect to change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH). The estimated coefficient for
change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
Several economic variables are regressed against change in per capita income. High local
government expenditures generally indicate increased provision of public goods and services.
Despite having a positive effect on per capita income growth, the coefficient for local government expenditure (LGEXP) is insignificant. As hypothesized, an increase in local tax per capita
(PCTAX) has a negative effect on per capita income growth, because taxes are an additional cost
to individuals. Thus high tax counties will become unattractive locations for households.
Regression results show that the percent of population below the poverty level (POVRATE) is
inversely related to per capita income growth. The coefficient for poverty rate (POVRATE) is
significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient for manufacturing establishment
(MFG) shows a negative relationship with per capita income growth and is only significant at the
10 percent level. Perhaps the logical explanation for this negative correlation may be that
manufacturing‟s role in the Appalachian region has evidently declined over the years, to the
extent of reducing its contribution to per capita income growth, and gross state product in
general.
One variable included to capture political party influence on economic growth is the
percent of votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE). The hypothesis that
Democratic Party control is associated with increased economic growth is confirmed, based on
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the positive and significant coefficient for VOTE. Similarly, location attributes, such as amenities
(AMEND) are positively related to income growth, but its coefficient is insignificant.
The coefficient for the percentage of population with a bachelor‟s degree or above
(DEGREE) is positive and significant, providing evidence for the well known relationship
between human capital skills and income growth. The percentage of population between 18 years
and 64 years (ACTIVE) is used to indicate the demographic group that is typically considered to
be in wage and salaried employment. The coefficient for ACTIVE has the correct positive sign,
but is insignificant. By contrast, an increase in the percent of population 65 years and older
(RETIRE) is negatively related to per capita income growth and the estimated coefficient for
RETIRE is significant at the 1 percent level.
Another demographic variable related to income growth is the percent of Black
population (BLACK). The coefficient for BLACK is negative and significant at the 10 percent
level. This finding confirms the hypothesis that counties with larger Black populations are
inversely related to income growth. These findings are realistic in view of the fact that majority
of the black population in the Appalachia live in the southern and central counties.8 By all
standards, the Appalachian Regional Commission considers the southern and central counties of
Appalachia to be the most economically distressed.
5.1.5 Change in Environmental Regulations Equation
Table 5.4 presents estimated results for the environmental regulations equation. The
estimated coefficient for 1992 environmental regulations (ENREG92) is positive and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. One explanation for this positive coefficient is that counties
8

Young et al. (2007) examine the relationship between race and economic growth using county level data on per
capita income, socioeconomic, and demographic factors for Mississippi. They find evidence that indicate that an
increase in percentage of Black population is negatively related to income growth.
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which are out-of-attainment in the initial period are likely to attract regulatory attention and thus
positively influence changes in environmental regulations. This is in view of the fact that some
counties will be out-of-attainment in a number of pollutants. Initial condition for population
(POP92) is positively related to change in environmental regulation and is significant at the 1
percent level. This finding illustrates that air pollution varies with population and therefore, an
increase in population will positively influence environmental regulations stringency. However,
the magnitude of population is very small.
Table 5.3: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Per Capita Income

Independent
Variable

Expected
Sign

Coefficient

-value

-/+

-0.7414

0.0000

PCI92

-

-0.3823

0.0001

POP92

+

0.0600

0.0017

EMPCH

+

0.0396

0.0061

+/-

0.1378

0.0001

POPCH

+

0.0142

0.7423

PCTAX

-

-1.7783

0.0943

DEGREE

+

11.8178

0.0063

AMEND

+

863.8531

0.1507

POVRATE

-

-85.8305

0.0072

BLACK

-

-128.5698

0.0807

ACTIVE

+

37.9073

0.1725

MFG

+

-7.0195

0.0566

RETIRE

-

-39.7288

0.0002

VOTE

+

99.8252

0.0429

LGEXP

+

34.1256

0.2280

0.5909

0.0054

ENREG92

ENREGCH

CONSTANT
= 0.4318
N = 410
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On the other hand, 1992 per capita income (PCI92) has a positive effect and thus
reinforces the hypothesis that an increase in income increases the demand for environmental
quality, assuming that environmental quality is a normal good. Similarly, a change in per capita
income (PCICH) has a positive effect on environmental regulation change and thus lends support
to the theory that at high income levels, the policy response towards environmental degradation
is stronger. The coefficient estimate for PCICH is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Employment change (EMPCH) is positively related to change in environmental regulations but
does not attain any statistical significance, while the coefficient for population change (POPCH)
is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The EPA considers children below 5 years and adults above 65 years to be particularly
sensitive to exposure to air pollutants. The percentage of the population who are considered
sensitive (RISK) to environmental exposures has the expected positive sign. Another variable
that is likely to result in increased emissions is the percentage of population driving to work
(POPDRIVE). The coefficient for POPDRIVE has the expected positive sign and is significant at
the 1 percent level. These findings further confirm the association between increased vehicular
traffic and air pollution. Regression results also indicate that state road density (ROADDEN)
positively influences changes in environmental regulation. In general, metropolitan counties are
associated with large population densities and commuters in metro areas typically drive long
distances to work. Thus, metro areas are associated with increased pollution. Surprisingly, the
estimated coefficient for METRO is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
As expected, the coefficient for population density (POPDEN) is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level. This follows because a dense population entails increased economic
activity and this typically translates into increased emissions of pollutants from both firms and
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households. The percent of votes cast for the Democratic president (VOTE) appears to have a
positive influence on environmental regulations outcomes. This finding is in accord with Kahn
and Matsusaka‟s (1997) finding that Democratic presidential voting patterns explain environmental outcomes.
Table 5.4: 3SLS Regression Estimation of Change in Environmental Regulations

Expected
Sign

Coefficient

+/-

0.6756

0.0000

POP92

+

0.0021

0.0156

PCI92

+

0.0411

0.0247

PCICH

+

0.0623

0.0007

POPCH

+

0.0044

0.0523

EMPCH

+

0.0536

0.3744

POVRATE

-

0.0081

0.0000

BLACK

-

0.0015

0.0003

RISK

+

0.0078

0.0015

POPDRIVE

+

0.0044

0.0000

METRO

+

-0.2506

0.0000

ROADDEN

+

0.1237

0.0022

SIERRA

+

0.0227

0.0065

DEGREE

+

0.0025

0.0005

MFGEMP

+/-

0.0032

0.4777

VOTE

+

0.0028

0.0000

POPDEN

+

0.0026

0.0013

MFG

+

0.0070

0.0380

0.52781

0.0000

Independent Variable
ENREG92

CONSTANT
= 0.9251
N= 410
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-value

The coefficient for manufacturing establishment (MFG) has the expected positive sign
and is significant at the 10 percent level. This implies that counties with a high number of
manufacturing establishments are likely to have more pollution and thus attract more enforcement of environmental regulations. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for percentage of population employed in manufacturing (MFGEMP) has the expected positive sign, but is insignificant.
The strength of environmental pressure groups on environmental outcomes is captured by
the presence of Sierra chapters in a county. The coefficient estimate for SIERRA is positive and
significant at the 5 percent level. These results provide evidence that environmental pressure
groups are pro-environment and thus will support stringent environmental regulations.
Additional information on the support for environmental regulation is provided by the positive
and significant coefficient for proportion of population with a bachelor‟s degree (DEGREE).
These findings suggest that counties featuring high levels of college graduates more strongly
support stringent environmental regulations.
Surprisingly, regression results indicate that counties exhibiting an increase in black
population (BLACK) are associated with an increase in the stringency of environmental
regulations. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for poverty rate (POVRATE) is also positive and
significant at the 1 percent level. These findings contradict the widely held view in the environmental justice literature that environmental regulations are more strictly enforced in predominantly white (Melosi and Pratt, 2007) and affluent neighborhoods than in black and economically
depressed neighborhoods. These findings are reinforced by anecdotal evidence presented in
figure 5.2 which shows, for example, that between 1992 and 2007 none of Mississippi‟s counties
had a non-attainment designation. This is important in view of the fact that Mississippi contains
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the largest number of Black population and has the highest unemployment rates in the
Appalachian Region. These findings corroborate Gray and Deily‟s (1996) finding that more
enforcement actions are directed towards plants located in communities with high unemployment
rates. By the same token, it can be inferred that more enforcement actions will be directed
towards plants located in minority neighborhoods in order to increase political support.
5.2 Spatial Durbin Model Results
Estimated results using the 8 nearest neighbors‟ spatial weight matrix are presented in
tables 5.5 through 5.8. The existence of spatial interdependences in the variables is confirmed by
the highly statistically and positive coefficients for rho ( . In the analyses that follow, the focus
is on the interpretation of the direct, indirect, and total effects. The interpretation of these results
is based on the methodology suggested by LeSage and Pace (2009).
5.2.1 SDM Results for Change in Population Equation
Table 5.5 presents the estimated results for the change in population equation. The
positive and significant coefficient for the spatial dependence parameter (rho

provides

evidence for the existence of the spatial effects working through the dependent variable (change
in population) and explanatory variables. The estimated direct effect associated with initial
population level (POP92) is −0.157. This means that, all else equal, a 1 point increase in initial
population in county will reduce growth in population by 0.157 points in that county. However,
it is highly plausible that a change in the initial levels of population in county not only induces
direct effects on population change in this county, but also induces indirect effects (spatial
spillovers) on neighboring counties. The estimated coefficient for the indirect or spatial spillover
impact for initial population is −0.063, but it is insignificant. Likewise, the total effect associated

93

with initial population is negative and significant. The estimated parameter for the total effect
suggests that a 1 point increase in initial population will reduce growth in population in county
and neighboring counties by 0.216. Overall, these findings confirm the convergence hypothesis
which states that on average, counties with small population levels will grow faster than counties
with high population levels.
Turning to employment, the estimated results indicate that initial employment levels
(EMP92) have a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on population growth. The estimated
coefficients for initial employment levels are insignificant. By the same token, growth in
employment (EMPCH) has a positive direct effect on population growth, hence providing
additional evidence that increased labor demand induces population growth. The estimated
coefficient for the indirect effect of EMPCH is positive and insignificant, while the total effect is
positive and highly significant.
The estimated results further show that initial environmental regulations (ENREG92)
have a negative direct effect on population growth and its coefficient is significant at the 1
percent level. This finding is in accord with results from the non-spatial model. Similarly, the
indirect effects of initial environmental regulation are negative and significant. These results
further show that changes in environmental regulation in one county have negative spillover
effects in surrounding counties and reduce population growth. Although the direct and indirect
estimates for initial environmental regulations are significant, the total effect estimate for initial
environmental regulations is insignificant. The insignificant result for the total effect may be due
to the fact that the linear combination of the direct and indirect fails to attain the restrictive 0.99
confidence interval and, thus causes the linear combination of the direct and indirect effects to be
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insignificant.9 After changing the confidence from the 99% to the upper 95% confidence
interval, the coefficient estimates for the direct, indirect, and total effects are all highly
significant (see appendix A).
Notable also is that the direct effect estimate of change in environmental regulations
(ENREGCH) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while the indirect and total effect
estimates are insignificant. The parameter estimate for direct effect of per capita income growth
(PCICH) has the anticipated positive sign and is statistically significant. Further, per capita
income growth appears to exhibit a positive indirect effect on population growth and is
significant at the 5 percent level. The positive indirect or spillover effect suggests that growth in
per capita income in a given county influences population growth in neighboring counties. The
total effect of per capita income growth is positive and significant. The parameter estimate for
the total effect suggests that a 1 point increase in per capita income in a given county increases
population growth for that county and other neighboring counties by 1.744 points.
Consistent with expectations, manufacturing establishment (MFG) has a positive direct
effect on population growth and its coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. Similarly,
manufacturing establishment has a positive indirect and total effect on population, but the
coefficients for both (indirect and total effect) are insignificantly different from zero.
Unemployment rate (UNEMP) has the expected negative direct effect, and a further review also
shows that unemployment rate has a positive indirect effect on population growth. This means
than an increase in unemployment rate in one county will positively influence population growth
in neighboring counties.
9

Derivation of the direct, indirect, and total effects uses an iterative process known as the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods (MCMC) and the estimates reported in table 5.5 are based on the upper 99 percent confidence
interval. I thank Professor Donald Lacombe for his help in understanding why it is possible to have significant
individual effect results, but insignificant total effect results.
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Local government expenditure (LGEXP) has a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on
population growth. These findings reveal that goods and services provided by local governments
will induce population growth in own county and neighboring counties. By comparison, per
capita local tax (PCTAX) has a negative direct effect on population growth, but is insignificant.
The indirect and total effect of the local tax variable is negative and significant at the 10 percent
level, respectively. Estimated results show that when median housing values (MHVAL) increase
in a given county, this has a negative direct effect on the county‟s population growth. Likewise,
an increase in median housing values in one county appears to exert a negative indirect or spatial
spillover effect on population growth in other neighboring counties. The total effect for median
housing value is negative and is insignificant.
Like housing values, local property taxes (PROPTAX) have a negative direct effect on
population growth. The implication of this finding is that an increase in county property taxes
discourages firms and households from locating in that county, thereby thwarting population
growth. The indirect effect of property taxes is similarly negative and its coefficient is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The direct effect for amenities index (AMEND) is
positive and significant, while the indirect effect is insignificant. The total effect for amenities is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Based on the positive direct effect of state road
densities, it is inferred that an increase in state road density (ROADDEN) increases population
growth.
5.2.2 SDM Results for Change in Employment Equation
Estimated results for the change in total employment equation are presented in table 5.6.
The estimated coefficient for

is positive (0.6467) and significant at the 5 percent level, and

thus provides evidence of strong spatial dependence. An examination of the results reveals that
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initial condition for total employment (EMP92) has a negative and significant direct effect on
change in employment. This finding confirms the non-spatial results that there is convergence in
employment in the Appalachia. Initial employment has a positive indirect effect, but the
coefficient is insignificant. The initial condition for population (POP92) and change in
population (POPCH) have a positive direct, indirect, and total effect on employment growth.
These findings show that employment growth can be influenced by the growth of labor supply
from within a county and labor supply from other neighboring counties. Over all, these findings
support the “people follow jobs” hypothesis.
Change in income (PCICH) has the expected positive direct effect on employment
growth but is insignificantly different from zero. Like in other estimations, the initial condition
for environmental regulation (ENREG92) exhibits a negative direct effect on employment
growth. The negative effect can be attributed to initial high investment costs in abatement
capital, which directly reduces firms‟ output and labor demand. The indirect effect estimate for
initial environmental regulations is negative and thus suggests that a change in environmental
regulations in a given county reduces employment growth in neighboring counties. Further,
estimates show that a change in a county‟s initial environmental regulation has a negative total
effect on that county and its neighbors.
By contrast, the change in environmental regulations variable appears to have a positive
effect on employment growth. These finding are consistent with previous studies (Goetz et al.
1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ringquist, 1993) in revealing that the short-run effects of
environmental regulation are reduced employment growth, but in the long-run environmental
regulation positively influences employment growth.
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Contrary to expectations, the number of manufacturing industries (MFG) has a negative
direct, indirect, and total effect on employment growth. The coefficient for the direct, indirect,
and total effect of manufacturing establishment is significant at the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 5
percent respectively. The negative indirect effect of manufacturing establishment implies that an
increase in neighboring counties‟ manufacturing establishments reduces employment growth in a
given county. Similarly, the total effect suggests that an increase in manufacturing establishments in one county decreases that county‟s and neighboring counties‟ employment growth.
Spatial regression results, again, confirm that unemployment rates (UNEMP) have a
negative direct effect on employment growth. Similarly, unemployment rate appears to exert a
negative indirect effect on employment growth. The interpretation of this negative indirect effect
is that, an increase in the county unemployment rate negatively affects employment growth in
neighboring counties. Also, regression results indicate that the amenities index (AMEND) has a
positive direct effect on employment growth and is significant at the 1 percent level. State road
density (ROADDEN) has the hypothesized positive direct effect on employment and is
significant at the 1 percent level.
Consistent with economic theory and past studies (Carlino and Mills, 1987; Helms,
1991), local government expenditure (LGEXP) has a positive direct effect on employment
growth. The estimated positive indirect effect for local government implies that an increase in
local government expenditure in one county will influence employment growth in neighboring
counties. Similarly, the percentage of population with bachelor‟s degree (DEGREE) has a
positive direct effect and is significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate for the indirect
impact of DEGREE is equal to −42.517, suggesting that an increase in the number of people with
bachelor‟s degrees in a given county will negatively influence employment growth in
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neighboring counties. The number of crimes has the anticipated negative direct effect on
employment growth, but parameter estimates for the indirect and total effects are insignificant.
5.2.3 SDM Results for Change in Per Capita Income Equation
SDM estimation results for the change in per capita income (PCICH) equation are
presented in table 5.7 and the estimated coefficient for the spatial dependence variable

is

positive (0.7259) and significant at the 5 percent level. As expected, the estimated coefficient for
initial per capita income (PCI92) exhibits a negative direct effect on per capita income growth—
and therefore, suggests that there is convergence in income in the Appalachia. This result is
similar to Gebremariam et al. (2007) and Santopietro‟s (2002) finding of income convergence in
the Appalachia. Estimated results further reveal that initial per capita income has a negative
indirect and total effect on income growth, and both are significant at the 5 percent and 10
percent levels, respectively.
Results for initial population (POP92) closely match the non-spatial results, where initial
population has a positive direct effect on per capita income growth. This is consistent with the
view that initial population levels represent available labor supply, and thus an increase in labor
supply will positively influence growth in income. Results further reveal that an increase in
initial population in one county has a negative indirect effect on per capita income growth in
other neighboring counties. Equally, change in population (POPCH) has a positive direct effect
on per capita income growth, implying that an increase in county labor supply increases county
per capita income. This seems plausible if we assume that population growth leads to increased
output, which in turn positively influences growth in per capita income. The estimated indirect
and total effects are positive and significant at the 5 percent level and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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The direct effect estimates for environmental regulations (ENREG92) show that an
increase in environmental regulations reduces per capita income growth in a county. One
explanation for this may be that the high abatement investment costs firms incur in the initial
period of pollution control negatively affects the labor demand within counties, which in turn,
results in the decline of per capita income growth. The indirect and total effects are insignificant.
Parallel to initial environmental regulations, change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is
associated with a positive direct effect on per capita income growth. These findings are similar to
the results from the non-spatial regressions. However, the indirect and total effect estimates of a
change in environmental regulation are insignificantly different from zero.
As hypothesized, employment growth (EMPCH) has a positive direct effect on income
growth and is significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated positive coefficient for the direct
effect of employment suggests that a 1 point increase in employment within a county increases
that county‟s per capita income by 0.202 points. The indirect and total effects for employment
growth are negative and significantly different from zero. The indirect effect results suggest that
a change in a given county‟s employment negatively affects income growth of neighboring
counties. The estimated coefficient for the unemployment rate (UNEMP) has the anticipated
negative direct effect on per capita income growth and is significant at the 10 percent level. The
negative coefficient implies that the unemployment rate works by discouraging population
growth, and this in turn retards income growth. Similarly, the unemployment rate has a negative
indirect effect and is significant at the 10 percent level.
The percentage of the population above 65 years (RETIRE) has the anticipated negative
direct effect, but its coefficient is insignificant. By contrast, the indirect effect for percentage of
population above 65 years is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. The direct effect
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estimate of percent of Black population (BLACK) has the anticipated negative sign and confirms
findings from the non-spatial regression model about the inverse relationship between Black
population and income.
5.2.4 SDM Results for Change in Environmental Regulations Equation
Table 5.8 presents summary SDM results for the change in environmental regulations
equation (ENREGCH). The estimated coefficient for

is positive ( = 0.539) and significant at

the 5 percent level, hence providing evidence for the existence of spatial dependence. The direct
effects estimate for initial environmental regulations (ENREG92) has the expected positive sign,
and its coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that counties with
stringent initial environmental regulation are likely to experience stringent environmental
regulation in future. The estimated indirect effect for initial environmental regulation is positive
but insignificant, while the total effect estimate for initial environmental regulation is positive
and significant at the 1 percent. The estimate of the total effect is equal to 0.6594 and is
significant at the 5 percent level. The interpretation of this is that a one point increase in county
‟s initial environmental regulation will increase environmental regulation stringency in that
county and neighboring counties by 0.6594. The positive total influence of county ‟s
environmental regulations on neighboring counties environmental regulations is suggestive of
the strategic interaction phenomena, which is consistent with the race to the top hypothesis. This
means that an increase in environmental regulations in one county provides an incentive for
neighboring counties to increase their environmental regulations. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002)
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find evidence of strategic interaction among a cross-section of countries in the determination of
environmental regulations for the agricultural sector.10
Consistent with expectations, initial per capita income (PCI92) has a direct positive effect
on environmental regulations. This finding supports the hypothesis that higher income people
will demand better environmental quality, and thus will demand more stringent environmental
regulation. The estimated indirect and total effect for initial levels of per capita is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level, respectively. Change in population (POPCH) has a positive
direct effect on environmental regulations as hypothesized. This finding is very important
because it shows that an increase in population will lead to greater pollution levels and thus exert
an upward pressure on environmental regulations. By the same token, change in population level
has a positive indirect and total effect.
Change in per capita income (PCICH) also exhibits a positive direct effect on
environmental regulations and is significant at the 1 percent level. The indirect effect for change
in per capita income is negative and insignificant. The effect of increasing a single county‟s per
capita income has a positive cumulative effect on neighboring counties‟ environmental regulation. In a related manner, the direct effect estimate of total employment change (EMPCH) has
the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1 percent level. Total employment change is
associated with a positive indirect and total effect on environmental regulations. These findings
are important in that they reveal the transboundary problem of pollution, which may stem from
different employment sectors in neighboring counties.
There is strong evidence that an increase in manufacturing establishments (MFG) has a
positive direct effect on environmental regulations and the coefficient is significant at the 1
10

Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) emphasize that the degree to which countries strategically interact depends on the
geographical distance and degree of trade openness. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) also find evidence of strategic
interaction in environmental policymaking among neighboring U.S. states.
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percent level. This finding illustrates that manufacturing industries are more likely to emit large
quantities of pollutants, which negatively affect air quality and thus influence the stringency of
environmental regulation. Both the indirect and total effects associated with manufacturing
establishments have insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, the percentage of population
employed in manufacturing (MFGEMP) has negative direct, indirect, and total impacts on
environmental regulations. However, only the indirect and total effects are significantly different
from zero.
The direct effect estimate for the percentage of the population below 5 years and above
65 years (RISK) is positive. This suggests that an increase in these two segments of the
population positively influences environmental regulation stringency in the affected county.
Support for stringent environmental regulation also comes from environmental interest groups,
such as the Sierra Club (SIERRA). The direct and indirect effect of Sierra chapters is positive but
insignificant, while the total effect is positive and significant. The percentage of the population
driving to work (POPDRIVE) has the expected positive direct effect on environmental regulation
stringency, but its coefficient is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the
indirect and total effect estimates for POPDRIVE are positive and significantly different from
zero. These findings support the theory that increased vehicle miles travelled contribute to air
pollution and thus induce more stringent environmental regulation. State road density
(ROADDEN) has positive direct and total effects.
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Table 5.5: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Population
Model Estimates &
Spatially lagged
Estimates
Independent
Variable

Coefficient

p-level

Direct Effect
Coefficient

Indirect Effect

t-prob

Coefficient

t-prob

Total Effect
Coefficient

t-prob

POP92

−0.157***

0

−0.153***

0

−0.063

0.9464

−0.216**

0.002

EMP92

0.084

0.239

0.082

0.469

0.042

0.9987

0.124

0.851

−0.426***

0

−0.446***

0

−0.782**

0.0046

−0.928

0.222

EMPCH

2.034***

0

2.036***

0

0.013

0.9672

2.049***

0

PCICH

1.076***

0

1.090***

0

0.655**

0.0031

1.744*

0.011

ENREGCH

0.198***

0

0.184***

0

0.662

0.5402

0.846

0.226

6.835*

0.028

6.893*

0.050

2.582

0.8139

9.475

0.409

UNEMP

−49.235

0.127

−46.415

0.272

140.921

0.2816

94.506

0.483

LGEXP

0.293***

0

0.299***

0

0.285**

0.0012

0.583**

0.003

PCTAX

−0.519

0.307

−0.619

0.551

−4.915*

0.0831

−5.534*

0.046

METRO

−554.293

0.054

−533.646

0.124

1046.955*

0.0339

513.310

0.645

MHVAL

−0.047***

0

−0.048***

0

0.062

0.9989

0.014

0.186

PROPTAX

−32.917**

0.001

−32.67***

0

−13.036***

0.0004

−45.713**

0.009

AMEND

768.664***

0

773.99***

0

225.352

0.4732

999.347**

0.001

ROADDEN

3370.606**

0.008

3430.85*

0.012

2839.834

0.3894

6270.685*

0.057

W-POP92

−0.131

0.005

W-EMP92

0.063

0.472

−0.898

0.090

W-EMPCH

2.426

0.007

W-PCICH

−1.294

0.272

0.165

0.019

ENREG92

MFG

W-ENREG92

W-ENREGCH
W-MFG

5.600

0.481

W-UNEMP

−23.308

0.115

W-LGEXP

−0.165

0

W-PCTAX

−0.828

0.006

W-METRO

959.226

0.143

W-MHVAL

0.010

0

W-PROPTAX

−17.495

0.123

W-AMEND

614.334

0.486

W-ROADDEN

1549.367

0.284

rho

0.5210** 0.009

Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively
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Table 5.6: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Employment

Independent
Variable

POP92
EMP92
ENREG92
PCICH
ENREGCH
POPCH
UNEMP
LGEXP
DEGREE
PROPTAX
MFG
CRIME
METRO
AMEND
VOTE
ROADDEN
W-POP92
W-EMP92
W-ENREG92
W-PCICH
W-ENREGCH
W-POPCH
W-UNEMP
W-LGEXP
W-DEGREE
W-PROPTAX
W-MFG
W-CRIME
W-METRO
W-AMEND
W-VOTE
W-ROAD
rho

Model Estimates &
Spatially lagged
Estimates
Coefficient

0.0991***
−0.0192*
−0.124***
0.040
0.744***
0.533***
−40.221*
0.136***
26.934*
−3.8406
−6.2909**
−0.0281
439.367*
332.47***
6.1980
312.91***
0.016***
−0.017
0.283
0.063
0.764
−0.0023
−68.864*
0.087
42.156*
−8.0512
−7.9363*
−0.1789*
5.7949
−272.303
*

37.904**
−124.871
0.647**

Direct Effect

Indirect Effect

Total Effect

p-level

Coefficient

t-prob

Coefficient

t-prob

Coefficient

t-prob

0
0.028
0
0.151
0
0
0.039
0
0.017
0.226
0.001
0.260
0.011
0
0.196
0
0
0.366
0.212
0.305
0.334
0.482
0.035
0.111
0.019
0.165
0.044
0.080
0.492

0.099***
−0.019***
−0.123***
0.0397
0.739***
0.531***
−40.581***
0.134***
26.849*
−3.865
−6.321**
−0.0276
439.893*
333.63***
6.3061
316.88***

0
0.057
0
0.303
0
0
0.087
0
0.033
0.456
0.001
0.540
0.022
0
0.391
0

0.0203*
0.011
−0.0901*
−0.064
0.041
0.0142
−116.48*
0.0939
−42.518*
−8.3874
−8.368*
0.1836
20.5329
−290.709*
39.194*
232.298

0.041
0.735
0.051
0.614
0.605
0.858
0.066
0.238
0.039
0.340
0.096
0.172
0.968
0.053
0.013
0.878

0.119***
−0.0087
−0.0667**
−0.024
0.781**
0.546***
−157.065*
0.228**
−15.669*
−12.25*
−14.689**
0.156
460.4266
42.926***
45.499**
549.177*

0
0.375
0.005
0.860
0.001
0
0.015
0.007
0.036
0.074
0.004
0.269
0.356
0
0.003
0.012

0.019
0.009
0.464
0.004

Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively
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Table 5.7: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Per Capita Income

Independent
Variable
PCI92
POP92
ENREG92
EMPCH
ENREGCH
POPCH
BLACK
RETIRE
MFG
UNEMP
PCTAX
DEGREE
AMEND
ACTIVE
VOTE
W*PCI92
W*POP92
W*ENREG92
W*EMPCH
W*ENREGCH
W*POPCH
W*BLACK
W*RETIRE
W*MFG
W*UNEMP
W*PCTAX
W*DEGREE
W*AMEND
W*ACTIVE
W*VOTE
rho

Model Estimates &
Spatially lagged
Estimates

Direct Effect

Coefficient

p-level

Coefficient

t-prob

−0.467***
0.218***
−0.201***
0.289***
0.103***
0.168***
−36.351
−2.378***
−24.709
−0.913*
−0.579*
−33.584
−88.870*
5.946*
4.283*
−0.543*
0.093
0.115*
−0.548***
0.107
0.239
56.475
−1.848
22.092*
−1.103
0.1247
−31.695
−22.33***
8.7412
28.317*
0.726

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.428
0
0.214
0.087
0.014
0.224
0.059
0.014
0.064
0.059
0.177
0.064
0
0.334
0.167
0.133
0.427
0.045
0.425
0.113
0.279
0.005
0.378
0.011
0.002

−0.435***
0.202***
−0.267***
0.203***
0.109***
0.197
−34.53***
−2.572
−23.999
−0.978*
−0.599
−35.724
−91.825
4.255
4.792*

0.0003
0
0
0
0
0.3713
0
0.4736
0.9667
0.0369
0.4819
0.1372
0.3501
0.1307
0.0857

Indirect Effect
Coefficient

−0.310**
−0.037
0.135
−0.983*
−0.001
0.308**
−33.285
−1.501*
−21.636
−0.877*
0.128*
−1.885
−21.003
93.923
3.921

t-prob

Total Effect
Coefficient

0.0066
−0.746*
0.3577
0.165**
0.719
−0.132
0.0933 −0.781**
0.9844
0.109
0.0095
1.205*
0.5056 −67.819**
0.013
−4.073
0.7851
−45.636
0.0184
−1.856*
0.0866
−0.472
0.319
33.838
0.743
112.828
0.6336
98.178
0.6436
8.712

Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively
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t-prob

0.0468
0.0047
0.1247
0.0048
0.3194
0.0644
0.0051
0.9693
0.1106
0.0700
0.1643
0.812
0.286
0.9707
0.3928

Table 5.8: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Environmental Regulations
Independent
Variables
PCI92
ENREG92
POPCH
EMPCH
PCICH
MFG
MFGEMP
POVRATE
BLACK
RISK
DEGREE
METRO
SIERRA
VOTE
POPDRIVE
ROADDEN
W-PCI92
W-ENREG92
W-POPCH
W-EMPCH
W-PCICH
W-MFG
W-MFGEMP
W-POVRATE
W-BLACK
W-RISK
W-DEGREE
W-METRO
W-SIERRA
W-VOTE
WPOPDRIVE
rho

Model Estimates &
Spatially lagged
Estimates
Coefficient

p-level

0.060***
0.676***
0.0013***
0.0413***
0.0825***
0.0021***
−0.0096
0.0057*
0.0040
0.0244***
0.0034
−0.1032**
0.0138
0.0031*
0.0022
0.3523*
−0.0015***
0.0868**
0.0032
0.0343*
0.0284**
−0.0015
−0.0092*
−0.0135*
0.0015
−0.0049
−0.005
0.0656
0.0915
−0.004

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4835
0.0895
0.434
0
0.147
0.0055
0.3665
0.0515
0.2725
0.0345
0
0.005
0.484
0.032
0.008
0.17
0.016
0.0555
0.3575
0.385
0.164
0.471
0.1115
0.143

0.024
0.539

0.003
0.0018

Direct Effect

Indirect Effect

Total Effect

Coefficient

t-prob

Coefficient

t-prob

Coefficient

0.059***
0.679***
0.0012***
0.039***
0.0983
0.0020***
−0.0054
0.0055
0.0041
0.0245***
0.0034
−0.1033*
0.0148
0.0031*
0.0019
0.3586*

0
0
0
0
0
0.0002
0.9991
0.1947
0.8646
0.0004
0.3040
0.0109
0.7336
0.0985
0.6004
0.0588

0.0033***
0.0205
0.018*
0.042*
−0.064
−0.0015
−0.0101*
−0.0142
0.0017
0.0027
0.0051
−0.0043
0.1025
0.0047
0.0266**
0.6025

0.0009
0.9190
0.0100
0.0555
0.4548
0.4155
0.0296
0.1353
0.6954
0.8754
0.3661
0.9718
0.2023
0.2549
0.0051
0.1466

0.0623***
0.7004**
0.0192***
0.081***
0.0343*
0.001
−0.0156*
−0.0087
0.0058
0.0272
0.0085
−0.1076
0.1173*
0.0078*
0.0285**
0.9611*

Note: ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level, respectively
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t-stat

0
0.0020
0
0.0004
0.0400
0.7642
0.0205
0.3411
0.5446
0.1966
0.7361
0.3723
0.0893
0.048
0.0082
0.0127

Figure 5.2: 2004 Attainment and Non-attainment Areas in the U.S. 8 Hour Ozone Standard

Source: EPA

Figure 5.3: 2007 Attainment and Non-Attainment Counties in Appalachia

Legend
Non-attainment counties

Attainment Counties
Appal Attainment Counties

ENREG90
0
1
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Figure 5.4: 1994 DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN APPALACHIA

Legend
appacountiestates
BLACK_1
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43.8640 - 85.6650

Figure5.5: 1992 UNEMPLYMENT RATES IN APPALACHIA

Legend
appacountiestates
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 Introduction
The relationship between environmental regulation and economic growth has been a
subject of long standing debate among economists and policymakers. The purpose of this
research is to address a number of questions that have arisen concerning the relationship between
environmental regulation and economic growth. The questions are: to what extent does
environmental regulation influence regional growth patterns and to what extent do regional
factors influence environmental regulations? To address these questions, this study, unlike
previous research, assumes that simultaneous interactions exist among changes in environmental
regulations, per capita income, population, and employment. In this vein, the first contribution of
this research is the ability to theoretically and empirically model the simultaneous relationships
among changes in environmental regulations, population, total employment, and per capita
income at the county-level. The analysis in this study assumes that the effects of environmental
regulations go beyond regulated firms.
Two econometric techniques are used to empirically examine the relationship between
changes in per capita income, employment, population, and environmental regulations. First, the
four systems of equations are estimated using the three-stage least squares technique. The second
estimation uses the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) and is estimated in MATLAB using the 8
nearest neighbors‟ spatial weight matrix. Thus, the second contribution of this study is the use of
the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) that quantifies the direct effects, indirect effects (spatial
spillovers), and the total or cumulative impacts. The direct effects represent the changes on a
given county‟s growth outcomes due to changes in own county characteristics, while the indirect
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impacts are spatial spillovers on neighboring counties that stem from changing a given county‟s
characteristics. The total or cumulative effects quantified as the sum of the direct and indirect
effect, measures the cumulative impact of a change in a county‟s characteristics averaged over
all other regions.
On the whole, both the three-stage least squares and SDM estimations produce robust
results by showing that environmental regulations implemented at the county-level are not
detrimental to regional growth. Model estimates show that initial environmental regulation
stringency is negatively related to growth (population, employment, and per capita income),
while the change in environmental regulation is positively associated with regional growth. The
initial conditions for environmental regulations intuitively mean that firms in non-attainment
counties invest in pollution abatement technologies in order to bring the air quality in compliance
with federal standards. As a consequence, the initial conditions can be interpreted as the shortrun effects of environmental regulations due to the fact that firms in non-attainment regions will
invest in pollution abatement technologies in the initial period. Investments in the initial period
result in increased production costs and reduced output. However, because of the spinoff effects,
other sectors of the economy will also be negatively affected and thus negatively affect regional
growth.
Considering the length of the period of analysis in this study (15 years), the change in
environmental regulations can be interpreted as the long-run effects. Within the endogenous
growth theory framework, firms adopt improved technologies which expand their production
functions as well as improve environmental quality. Theoretically, this means that the long-run
effect of environmental regulations is improved output and better environmental quality. Thus, it
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is not surprising that the change in environmental regulations is consistently found to have a
positive effect on growth in employment, population, and per capita income.
6.1 Summary and Conclusions, Non-Spatial Models
In the three-stage least squares estimation, population change or growth is positively
associated with growth in per capita income and employment. This is a key finding that suggests
that an increase in labor demand through expansions in economic output positively influences
population growth in Appalachia. Results from the non-spatial model show that change in
environmental regulation is positively associated with population growth. The presumption is
that the initial conditions of environmental regulations increase the compliance and operating
costs for regulated firms and thus retard economic growth. The change in environmental
regulations is intuitively interpreted as the long-run effects; therefore, the long-run benefit of
environmental regulation stringency is improved environmental quality, which also directly
stimulates population growth. The unexpected negative effect of manufacturing establishments
on population growth demonstrates the declining role of manufacturing in the Appalachian
economy and could also be construed to mean that manufacturing jobs in the Appalachia are low
paying. Local government expenditure programs seem to be important in explaining Appalachian
population growth. This is very important because it shows that local government expenditure
policies play key roles in the development process in Appalachian counties.
Three-stage least squares estimate further reveal that employment growth can be
stimulated by population growth. This finding seems plausible if we assume that labor demand
parallels labor supply, or if the rate of growth of population is slow relative to employment
growth. Environmental regulations pursued at the county level seem to negatively affect
employment growth only in the initial stages of implementation, but after a certain time lag,
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environmental regulations positively influence employment growth. Thus, this study concludes
that environmental regulation does not slow long-term economic growth, but rather stimulates
employment growth. This seems reasonable because the initial cost outlays for abatement
technology are sunk costs, and therefore, rational profit maximizing firms do not base their
future production decisions on sunk costs. Under this assumption, the efficient technology that
firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental
quality. These findings complement the theoretical analysis in chapter 3. In addition, these findings support Tannenwald‟s (1997) hypothesis that internalization of externalities makes jurisdictions attractive to business, households, and leisure travelers. Therefore, these findings should
offer some consolation to businesses, politicians, and local policymakers who fret about the
negative economic impacts of environmental regulation implementation.
Similarly, three-stage least squares estimation reveals that environmental regulation only
negatively affects per capita income growth in the short-term, but has a positive influence on per
capita income growth in the long-run. Under this circumstance, these findings reinforce the
notion that environmental regulation enhances a jurisdiction‟s environmental quality, thereby
making the area more attractive to workers, executives, businesses, retirees, and so on. Furthermore, the results indicate that growth in employment, combined with percentage increase in
population with bachelor‟s degrees are associated with growth in per capita income. Results
further support the bidirectional causal relationship between population growth and per capita
income growth. However, the percent of Black population, property taxes, poverty rate,
percentage of the population above 65 years, and local taxes significantly reduce growth in per
capita income.
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Last but not least, empirical results from the three-stage least squares estimation show
that environmental regulation stringency is influenced by employment growth, initial environmental regulation, per capita income, county poverty rate, percent of black population, and
percentage of vulnerable population. An increase in the number of county manufacturing
establishments and employment tends to exert upward pressure on environmental regulation. The
study also finds empirical evidence that suggest that environmental interest groups, percentage of
population with bachelor‟s degree, Democratic Party influence, population density, percentage of
population driving to work, and road density have a positive effect on environmental regulations
stringency.
6.2 Summary and Conclusions from the SDM Model
To provide insights concerning spatial interdependences among the variables, the spatial
Durbin Model (SDM) is employed. The motivation for using the SDM model stems from the
plausibility that a county‟s characteristics (both dependent variable and explanatory variables)
may influence growth rates in neighboring counties. In this case, there is a need to capture the
spillover impacts, which cannot be captured in non-spatial regressions. The SDM estimation
allows inferences to be made in terms of direct impacts, indirect or spillover impacts, and total
(cumulative) impacts.
Overall, SDM estimations are consistent with the non-spatial regressions by revealing
that environmental regulations negatively affect regional growth only in the short-term period,
but in the long run, environmental regulations stimulate growth in population, per capita income,
and employment. Similarly, SDM estimations present strong evidence that environmental
regulation outcomes are positively influenced by changes in employment, population, and per
capita income. The SDM estimations further reveal that changes in a county‟s environmental
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regulation, per capita income, employment, and population do not only depend on own-county
characteristics (direct effects), but are influenced by other counties‟ characteristics (indirect
effects). For example, based on the positive coefficients for the total effects of initial
environmental regulations, this study concludes that there is some form of strategic interaction
among some Appalachian counties in environmental policymaking. The strategic interaction is in
a form of the race to top, which means that a given county‟s environmental regulation stringency
has a positive impact on neighboring counties‟ environmental regulation outcomes. This finding
is very important because it shows that even in the face of stiff interstate economic competition
counties (and states) do not lower environmental regulations, but instead mimic neighboring
counties‟ stringent environmental standards.
The results from the SDM estimations overall show that a county‟s growth rate will not
only depend on its characteristics, but also on indirect impacts emanating from neighboring
counties. These indirect impacts arise due to the spatial connectivity of the counties and tend to
be localized (LeSage and Fischer, 2009). Therefore, the second contribution of this research is
the ability to illustrate the important role spillover effects play in regional growth.
6.3 Policy Recommendations
Empirical findings from both the non-spatial model and spatial Durbin model have
important policy implications. First, the results indicate that population growth is stimulated by
an increase in per capita income, employment growth, local government expenditure, and
amenities. Population growth entails supply of labor with a variety of skills, and therefore,
counties that are concerned about population growth should adopt economic strategies that will
stimulate growth in employment and provide high incomes. By creating a strong economy, the
educated Appalachians will be encouraged to stay in the region.
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Second, cognizant of the positive direct and indirect impacts that local government
expenditure policies have on regional economies, economically distressed Appalachian counties
should find means of increasing the provision of public goods and services. The increased and
continued supply of public goods and services has a direct effect of attracting new firms and
stimulating growth of existing firms, and this indirectly induces population and per capita
income growth. Consistent with economic base theory, manufacturing‟s role cannot be ignored,
given that manufacturing has the potential to generate a large number of jobs. This study shows
that employment growth and per capita income growth can be stimulated by manufacturing
establishments. Therefore, there is a need to revitalize the role of manufacturing in Appalachia.
Third, the analyses conducted in both the non-spatial and spatial model underscore the
fact that environmental regulation has a negative impact on regional growth only in the shortterm. The long-term benefit of environmental regulation is improved firm competitiveness, as
hypothesized by Porter and van der Linde (1995), and improved environmental quality.
Therefore, states working to simultaneously improve their business climate and stimulate
economic growth should not neglect environmental regulation by lobbying for less stringent
standards. Instead, state governments should develop state implementation plans (SIPs) that
enhance their jurisdictions‟ environmental quality, induce innovation in firms, and thus stimulate
long-term growth through migration of firms and households.
The analyses conducted also highlight that environmental regulation outcomes are
positively influenced by socio-economic and demographic factors. Thus, another policy
implication is that, besides imposing stringent environmental regulation on polluting industries,
there is need to pay attention to socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to
pollution.
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6.4 Research Limitations and Suggestions of Future Research
There are several issues in the research that have not been effectively addressed. The first
limitation of this study pertains to data. For example, data related to land use patterns could have
been incorporated in the model in order to highlight its impact on regional growth and environmental regulation setting because land use patterns reflect human impacts on the environment.
Other data problems pertain to the inability to account for effects of technological changes on
regional growth and environmental regulation outcomes. Inarguably, technological changes have
implications for both regional growth and air quality. Lastly, while the use of the county
attainment status is a good proxy for environmental regulation stringency, it contains only a
limited amount of information. However, because the environmental regulation index
constructed provides some spatial variation in implementation, we believe that the county
attainment status is a reasonable proxy in this study.
The empirical findings indicate that environmental regulation positively influences
economic growth in the long-term. This result needs further attention in the form of further
research that investigates the time lag between environmental regulation change and improved
economic performance. This can be achieved by using a dynamic model and data that cover a
considerable time period.
Empirical evidence that indicates that counties with high unemployment rates and high
Black populations are associated with stringent environmental regulation stringency should be
interpreted with caution. Could we be committing a type I error by inferring that poor
neighborhoods are not excessively exposed to air pollution relative to other communities?
Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the simultaneous relationship between rate of
exposure to pollutants and environmental regulation stringency.
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APPENDIX A
Table 5.6: SDM Estimation Results of Change in Population (95% confidence Interval)

Independent
Variables

Coefficient

Direct Effect

p-level

Coefficient

Indirect Effect

t-prob

Coefficient

Total Effect

t-prob

Coefficient

t-prob

POP92

−0.189***

0

−0.188***

0

−0.057***

0

−0.245***

0

EMP92

0.122***

0

0.124***

0

0.064***

0

0.188***

0

−0.467

0

−0.467***

0

−0.322***

0

−0.789***

0

EMPCH

1.854***

0

1.856***

0

0.087**

0.007

1.943***

0

PCICH

1.235***

0

1.235***

0

0.534***

0

1.769***

0

ENREGCH

0.167***

0

0.171***

0

0.233**

0.005

0.404***

0.0001

6.663*

0

6.662***

0

2.582***

0

9.244***

0

UNEMP

−48.235*

0.011

−48.232*

0.054

35.056

0.345

−13.176

0.483

LGEXP

0.297***

0

0.302***

0

0.268**

0.0012

0.570***

0

PCTAX

−0.545*

0.024

−0.545*

0.032

−0.234*

0.067

−0.779*

0.039

METRO

−534.333***

0

−534.146***

0

234.012*

0.0245

−300.134*

0.023

MHVAL

−0.054***

0

−0.055***

0

0.046***

0

−0.009***

0

PROPTAX

−33.113***

0

−33.113***

0

−16.235***

0

−49.348***

0

AMEND

763.321***

0

765.67***

0

223.241**

0.0041

988.911**

0.001

ROADDEN

3254.403***

0

3254.231***

0

2634.002***

0

5888.233***

0

W-POP92

−0.178***

0

W-EMP92

0.143*

0.034

−0.658*

0.023

W-EMPCH

2.033***

0

W-PCICH

−1.445**

0.0063

0.173**

0.0014

5.888*

0.054

−27.032

0.312

W-LGEXP

−0.156***

0

W-PCTAX

−0.783**

0.002

W-METRO

931.023*

0.091

W-MHVAL

0.0654***

0

−26.342*

0.081

634.421

0.356

W-ROADDEN

2317.764

0.133

rho

0.895***

0

ENREG92

MFG

W-ENREG92

W-ENREGCH
W-MFG
W-UNEMP

W-PROPTAX
W-AMEND
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